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URING the Survey period the courts decided numerous cases of
interest in the area of real property law, and the Seventieth Legisla-
ture enacted changes in the area. This article reviews the more sig-
nificant decisions and legislative enactments of the period.
I. TITLE AND CONVEYANCE
A. Conveyancing and Title Generally
In City of Richland Hills v. Bertelsen I the court dealt with the conflicting
claims of a city and a land purchaser to certain lots. The purchaser acquired
the lots and requested that the city vacate the recorded plat of the property.
The city then informed the purchaser that it claimed a public park and ease-
ment as to a portion of the property pursuant to an unrecorded plat. 2 The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the purchaser upon find-
ing that he was a bona fide purchaser and that his predecessor in title had
not dedicated the lots in question as a public park.3
On appeal, the court first recited the general rule that a bona fide pur-
chaser for value is a person who has no notice and purchases property in
good faith for valuable consideration. 4 Since the parties did not dispute that
the purchaser had given value for the property, the court only had to deter-
mine whether the purchaser had notice of the city's claims. The plat relied
upon by the city had not been filed in the real property records. The court
therefore found that the purchaser had neither constructive notice nor a
duty to search the city's records since nothing in the real property records
constructively notified him of the existence of the plat relied upon by the
city.5 The court also found that the affidavits submitted in the summary
judgment proceeding supported the trial court's holding that the purchaser
did not have actual knowledge of the city's claim, and, accordingly, the
* B.S., Bowling Green State University; J.D., University of Houston. Partner, Vinson
& Elkins, Dallas.
1. 724 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
2. The opinion initially refers to the unrecorded plat as being an "antecedent unrecorded
plat," but subsequently refers to the plat as being a "subsequent unsigned plat." Id. at 429-30.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 429 (citing Neal v. Holt, 69 S.W.2d 603, 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1934,
writ ref'd)).
5. 724 S.W.2d at 430-31.
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court upheld the purchaser's bona fide purchaser status. 6 The city argued
that its acceptance of the dedication of the park effectively terminated the
power of the purchaser's grantor to convey the lots. The court of appeals,
however, found that the dedication of the park to the city constituted the
grant of an easement with the purchaser's predecessor in title retaining fee
ownership that could be conveyed to the purchaser. 7
The court faced an unusual fact situation in a suit for reformation of a
deed in Davis v. Grammer.8 The seller of property sought reformation of a
deed that conveyed an entire lot rather than the western portion of the lot as
the parties had agreed upon. At trial the purchaser of the property raised
issues concerning fraudulent misrepresentations made by the seller's real es-
tate agent and attorney regarding the status of a lease affecting the property.
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision denying reformation
because the seller of the lot had unclean hands by virtue of the fraudulent
misrepresentations as to the lease and because the points of error raised by
the seller on appeal did not adequately request reformation as a remedy,
notwithstanding the findings of fraud.9 The dissent would have granted ref-
ormation notwithstanding the finding of fraud, leaving the lot buyer to his
remedies for the fraudulent statements, since the fraud in question did not go
to the nature of the property description but rather to other matters.10
Davis v. Pletcher11 dealt with claims concerning a shortage of acreage in a
conveyance and the related acceleration of a purchase money debt. The dis-
pute arose out of language in a general warranty deed concerning the time
period within which a claim could be brought for shortages in the acreage
purportedly conveyed. 12 The purchaser sent a mailgram to the seller stating
that a survey obtained by the purchaser indicated that a shortage in acreage
existed, asserting rights to an abatement of the purchase price because of the
shortage and requesting a refund of overpaid interest. Subsequently, the
purchaser sought to make the next required purchase money mortgage pay-
ment into the registry of the court, a request that the court later denied. 13
The sellers accelerated the debt because of the failure to make the full mort-
gage payment in question. On appeal the court of civil appeals reversed the
trial court's judgment against the purchaser, finding that notice of the
6. Id. at 431.
7. Id. (citing Popplewell v. City of Mission, 342 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
8. 727 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ granted).
9. Id. at 23-24. The seller had raised only the factual insufficiency of the evidence con-
cerning fraud on appeal. Id. at 24.
10. Id. at 24-25 (Chapa, J., dissenting).
11. 727 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12. The deed provided that "[s]uch covenant [as to acreage conveyed] shall be deemed to
be broken only if Grantors are furnished by Grantee, within a period of five (5) years from the
date hereof, with the results of a subsequent survey prepared by a licensed or a certified sur-
veyor or licensed engineer covering the property conveyed hereunder which discloses by certi-
fied field notes and plat that there are fewer than six hundred and seventy (670) acres under
fence ..... Id. at 33. The deed recited that it was executed as of July 1, 1977, but was not
signed by the sellers until July 5, 1977.
13. Id. at 31.
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shortage in acreage was timely given within the requirements of the deed.' 4
The court also held that the acceleration was of no effect as it would have
been inequitable to accelerate the indebtedness since the purchaser had given
timely notice of the shortage in acreage claim, had offered to pay the full
amount of the disputed mortgage payment into the registry of the court, and
had further tendered to the sellers the next mortgage payment less a credit
for the amount of interest overpaid because of the shortage in area.' 5
Houston Title Co. v. Ojeda De Toca 16 dealt with claims brought by a pur-
chaser of a house arising out of the existence of a condemnation order issued
by a city. The purchaser acquired an improved lot after the city issued a
demolition order for the improvements that was filed in the real property
records. Subsequently, pursuant to the order, the city demolished the im-
provements and posted a lien against the property for the demolition cost.
The purchaser then brought suit against its seller and against the title insur-
ance company that issued an owner's policy of title insurance in connection
with the transaction alleging misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence,
violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act 17 and real estate fraud
statutes, and breach of fiduciary trust.' 8 At trial the jury answered special
issues in favor of the purchaser and the trial court entered judgment on the
verdict.' 9 On appeal the title insurance company first argued that the judg-
ment against it on the negligence claims was in error as a matter of law
because it owed no duty to discover the city order in question. The court of
civil appeals agreed with this argument, noting that the obligation of a title
insurer arises under its insurance policy, the relationship between insurer
and insured being that of an indemnitor and an indemnitee, and held that
there was no duty on the part of the title insurance company to discover title
defects. 20 The sellers argued that the trial court had erred in granting judg-
ment against them on the deceptive trade practice claims, relying on the
recordation of the demolition order in the county records, asserting that the
recordation was constructive notice of the order and that this notice consti-
tuted a defense as a matter of law. The court of civil appeals sustained this
argument as well, stating that the constructive notice afforded by real estate
recordation statutes is a defense to a cause of action under the Deceptive
Trade Practice Act.2 ' The seller's argument defeated the purchaser's claims
concerning fraud as well, and the court reversed the judgment of the trial
court and entered judgment in favor of the title insurance company and the
14. Id. at 34-35.
15. Id. at 35-36.
16. 733 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
17. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.826 (Vernon 1987).
18. The court did not specifically identify the real estate fraud statutes, but presumably
the relevant statute is id. § 27.01.
19. 733 S.W.2d at 326.
20. Id. at 327 (citing Tamburine v. Center Sav. Ass'n, 583 S.W.2d 942, 947 (lex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
21. Id. (citing Medallion Homes, Inc. v. Thermar Invs., Inc., 698 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex.




The court interpreted a reverter provision contained in a deed in Sewell v.
Dallas Independent School District.23 The grantor had conveyed to a prede-
cessor in interest to the Dallas Independent School District certain land on
the condition that the property be used only for school purposes. 24 The
school district so used the property for some time, but as a result of rulings
against the school district in a desegregation suit, the school located on the
property was closed and used as a storage facility for school equipment and
supplies. Subsequently, the school district leased a majority of the land to
the City of Dallas for use as a recreation center. The court of civil appeals,
in reversing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the school
district, found that the language in the deed clearly created a condition sub-
sequent. 25 The court then found that Sewell had introduced sufficient evi-
dence at trial to show that the district bad failed to use the property in
question for school purposes, and held that the trial court had erred in enter-
ing judgment in favor of the district, even though a portion of the property
was used as a maintenance facility by the district, and entered judgment in
favor of the holder of the reversionary right.26
Wessely Energy Corp. v. Jennings,27 although dealing with title to oil and
gas interests, presents an issue concerning conveyancing of importance to all
real estate practitioners. The supreme court addressed the constitutionality
of a repealed coverture statute and the effect of its determination as to con-
stitutionality on Texas land titles. Former article 1299 of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes, 28 repealed in 1963, required that a husband and wife join in
conveying real estate that was the separate property of the wife. 29 In Jen-
nings a predecessor in title to the current claimants had executed a deed
admittedly not in compliance with former article 1299 and, thus, a dispute
arose between those parties claiming under the deed and those parties claim-
ing under the laws of inheritance.
The supreme court first analyzed the constitutionality of former article
1299 and had no difficulty finding that the former article was unconstitu-
tional under both the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitu-
tion.30 The court further found that the issue of constitutionality was clearly
not mooted by virtue of the statute's repeal since the issue was squarely in
22. Id. at 328. The purchaser did not bring any contract claim against the seller, nor any
claim against the title insurer under the title insurance policy.
23. 727 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24. The deed provided as follows: "This conveyance is made and accepted subject to the
following condition: The herein conveyed property shall be used for school purposes only, and
in the event of the breachof [sic] this condition, title to the hereinafter described propertyshall
[sic] revert to and vest in the grantor herein, his heirs and assigns." Id. at 587.
25. Id. at 588 (citing, inter alia, City of Dallas v. Etheridge, 152 Tex. 9, 12, 253 S.W.2d
640, 641-42 (1952)).
26. 727 S.W.2d at 590-91.
27. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 530 (July 1, 1987).
28. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1299, repealed by Act of June 10, 1963, ch. 473,
§§ 1-2, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 1189, 1189-90.
29. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 531.
30. Id. at 532 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstera, 450 U.S. 455, 459-60 (1981); Stanton v.
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front of the court. Since the statute was clearly unconstitutional, the court
found that the parties had properly executed the deed in question and had
therefore conveyed title.31 The court then faced the issue of whether to
make its ruling prospective only. The court held that its ruling would be
prospective and would not apply to other title taken under a former article
1299 defect. 32 For the practitioner, this raises interesting issues because of
the ambiguity as to what a former article 1299 defect is in the context of
taking title. Presumably, only those deeds previously challenged in court
and set aside will be left untouched by the decision.
In Moore v. Rotello 33 the court dealt with a dispute concerning the right
to remove gravel from an abandoned railroad right-of-way. The party that
removed the gravel had acquired the contractual right to remove portions of
the gravel, railroad ties, and bridges remaining in the right-of-way after the
railroad company had abandoned it, and had also attempted to acquire the
actual right-of-way but evidently could not obtain clear title from the rail-
road. In defense of a claim of trespass the gravel remover alleged that the
conveyance of the property adjoining the right-of-way to the abutting land-
owner had excluded the railroad right-of-way because of language in the
deed saving and excepting the right-of-way. The court of appeals held that
the issue was governed by the rules developed to deal with ownership of
narrow strips of land, such as rights-of-way and easements abutting larger
tracts, and found that the "save and except" language in the original deed
was not an express reservation and had no effect other than to burden the
grant originally made with the existence of the right-of-way. 34 The party
removing the gravel had also argued that the gravel was personal property
and was not part of the underlying real estate, but the court found that over
a sixty-five year period the gravel had become so intermingled with the soil
that it had become part of the realty. 35 Since the gravel was not personalty
and the removing party had no right to enter the abandoned right-of-way,
the court found the removing party liable for the resulting damages.36
B. Perpetuities
Garza v. Sun Oil Co.37 dealt with construction of the rule against perpetu-
ities. The owners of a surface estate brought suit to clear title to certain
property and to determine the rights to certain royalty payments, alleging
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975); Burroughs v. Lyles, 142 Tex. 704, 711-12, 181 S.W.2d 570, 574
(1944)).
31. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 533.
32. Id. at 533-34.
33. 729 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. Id. at 375-76 (citing Lewis v. East Tex. Fin. Co., 136 Tex. 149, 154, 146 S.W.2d 977,
980 (1941) (when an instrument conveys described land and excepts a right-of-way, road or
easement, the instrument conveys fee title to the entire tract unless the instrument clearly
indicates an intent to reserve the strip of land)). The court also found that the abandonment of
the right-of-way did not affect application of the principle. Id.
35. Id. at 376.
36. Id. at 375-76.
37. 727 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
1988]
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that they had acquired the property in question by exercise of an option
granted in a previous surface lease. 38 The parties holding conflicting royalty
claims asserted that the option was void under the rule against perpetuities.
The court of civil appeals held the option invalid, finding by the clear lan-
guage of the option that the interest might not vest until after the restricted
period and, accordingly, that the option was void and could not be
exercised. 3
9
C. Statute of Frauds
In Penwell v. Barrett4° the court dealt with the requisites for taking an
oral contract for the sale of real estate out of the statute of frauds. A daugh-
ter and her husband moved into a home owned by her father after spending
several months renovating the property. At trial they alleged that they had
agreed with her father to pay rent for a period of time and then orally agreed
to purchase the property, applying rental payments towards the purchase
price, which was to be the appraised value of the property. The court of civil
appeals found that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support
upholding the oral contract for the sale of land, applying well settled Texas
law concerning the elements required to take an oral land sale contract out
of the coverage of the statute of frauds.
41
D. Flooding
In Abbott v. City of Princeton 42 the court reversed a summary judgment in
favor of a city as against an action brought by landowners for damages re-
sulting from flooding of their land.43 The landowners initially brought suit
in 1982 alleging that certain actions of the city in connection with work on a
street adjoining their land caused flooding. Subsequent to the institution of
the suit, the landowners conveyed the tract in question. The court granted
38. The option provided as follows: "At the expiration of thirty (30) years from [Septem-
ber 12, 1938], or at any time thereafter, if LESSEES, their heirs or assigns, during the entire
term of this lease have punctually and fully complied with all of their obligations under this
lease, then and in that event LESSORS hereby give LESSEES, their heirs and assigns, the
option to purchase the above described land .... " Id. at 117 (emphasis by the court).
39. Id. at 117-18. The court stated that the rule against perpetuities "provides that no
interest is valid unless it must vest, if at all, within 21 years after the death of some life or lives
in being at the time of creation of the interest, plus the normal gestation period when neces-
sary," and that a "grant or interest which may not timely vest within that period of time and
which operates to take property out of commerce and restrict its alienation, is void." Id. at
116 (citing Henderson v. Moore, 144 Tex. 398, 401, 190 S.W.2d 800, 801 (1946); Brooker v.
Brooker, 130 Tex. 27, 39, 106 S.W.2d 247, 254 (1937)).
40. 724 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
41. Id. at 904. The court noted that the elements required for exemption from the statute
are as follows:
(1) payment of the consideration, whether it be in money or services; (2) posses-
sion by the vendee; and (3) the making by the vendee of valuable and permanent
improvements upon the land with the consent of the vendor or, or without such
improvements, the presence of such facts as would make the transaction a fraud
upon the purchaser if it were not enforced.
Id. (citing Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 1209, 229 S.W. 1114, 1116 (1921)).
42. 721 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. Id. at 876.
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the city summary judgment because by conveyance of the property the land-
owners had lost their cause of action, because their suit was barred by limita-
tions, because the city was not a person within the meaning of the relevant
statute, and because the landowners were not damaged because the property
had increased in value over the period in question. 44
In reversing and remanding for trial the court of appeals first dealt with
the question of whether the landowners had lost the right to maintain their
action by conveying the property. The court found that an owner can still
pursue an action to recover damages incurred while he owns the property
even if he conveys the property during the suit.4 5 In dealing with the limita-
tions issue, the court found it necessary to determine the type of injury sus-
tained. Since the flooding occurred sporadically following rainfall, the
owner suffered intermittent injury that was irregular and contingent upon an
outside force. 46 The court found that suit could be maintained for injuries
sustained during the two-year period prior to the filing of the suit.47 As a
third ground, the city alleged that it was not subject to the claim brought by
the landowners under section 11.086(a) of the Texas Water Code48 inasmuch
as the city was not a "person" within the meaning of the statute.49 The city
relied upon a previous Texas Supreme Court decision 50 to support its posi-
tion. The court of appeals, however, noted that this decision preceded the
codification of the Texas water control statutes and found that the city was a
"person" for purposes of the Texas Water Code by virtue of the provisions of
the Texas Code Construction Act.5' Finally, the appellate court found that
although the tax rolls showed an increase in the value of the property, this
increase was not compelling evidence that the owners had suffered no loss,
since evidence could be produced to show that the property had not appreci-
ated as much as it would have absent the acts complained of.52 The court
therefore reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial.5 3
44. Id. at 874.
45. Id. at 875 (citing Richey v. Stop N Go Markets of Texas, Inc., 643 S.W.2d 505, 507
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), aff'd, 654 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1983)).
46. Id.
47. Id. The court noted that a suit for permanent damages to land accrues on the date of
the first injury and that the limitation period would expire two years after that date. Id.
48. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.086(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
49. Section 11.086(a) of the Texas Water Code provides that "No person may divert or
impound the natural flow of surface waters in this state, or permit a diversion or impounding
by him to continue, in a manner that damages the property of another by the overflow of the
water diverted or impounded." Id.
50. City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. 1968).
51. 721 S.W.2d at 876. The Texas Code Construction Act provides, in relevant part, that
the term "person" includes "corporation, organization, government or governmental subdivi-
sion or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, and any other legal en-
tity." TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 311.005(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988). A predecessor to this
provision was in effect at the time of the granting of summary judgment. Act of June 12, 1967,
ch. 455, § 1, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 1036, repealed by Act of June 11, 1985, ch. 479, § 224, 1985
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3361 (Vernon).




E. Trespass to Try Title
During the Survey period Texas courts addressed several cases with inter-
esting issues concerning trespass to try title actions. Singleton v. Terrel154
dealt with the standards required for a party to prevail in a trespass to try
title suit. The plaintiffs in the suit were the successors in interest to a pur-
chaser from the State of Texas. The property had been forfeited to the State
because of failure to pay deferred purchase money pursuant to the relevant
statutes. 5 The predecessor in title to the defendants in the suit purchased
the land from the State before the end of the five year period allowed for
reinstatement following a forfeiture under a deed that the plaintiffs claimed
was a forgery. The defendants had been in possession of the land since 1970.
Finding that neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessors in title had taken
any action to set aside the forfeiture, the court of appeals held that they were
not able to prevail in a trespass to try title suit since a requisite of such a suit
is that the plaintiff rely on the strength of its own title and not the deficien-
cies of the defendant's title.56 Although the plaintiffs contended that the
defendant's title was void, the court noted that this contention did not make
the patent to the defendant's predecessor in title void and further found that
the plaintiffs had no standing to raise any defect in the State's patent to the
defendant's predecessor.5 7 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's holdings that the plaintiffs did not establish title and held that
the defendants had adjudicated title as possessors of the property.58
In Williams v. Ballard 59 the court of civil appeals held that the veterans
land board, as the vendor under an executory contract for deed, was not a
necessary party to a trespass to try title action brought by a party claiming
title by virtue of adverse possession. 6° The trial court dismissed the case
because of the failure of the adverse possessor to name the veterans land
board as a defendant. The court of civil appeals reversed, citing the estab-
lished rule in trespass to try title cases that the only necessary defendant is
the person in possession of the land. 61 The court found that the interest of
the veterans land board was comparable to the interest of a mortgagee since
equitable title had passed to the vendee and the rights retained by the board
were similar to rights reserved under a mortgage or deed of trust.62 The
54. 727 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ).
55. TEX. REV. Civ. ANN. art. 5326 (Vernon 1962) (current version at TEX. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. §§ 51.071, 51.074 (Vernon 1978)).
56. 727 S.W.2d at 690 (citing Hunt v. Heaton, 643 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. 1982)).
57. Id. at 691 (citing Betts v. Texas Pac. Land Trust, 524 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
58. Id.
59. 722 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
60. Id. at 11.
61. Id. (citing Booty v. O'Connor, 13 S.W.2d 220, 226 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1928),
aff'd sub nom. Brooks v. O'Connor, 120 Tex. 121, 125, 39 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1931)).
62. Id. (citing City of Garland v. Wentzel, 294 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1956, no writ)). Adverse possession rights will generally not run against the sovereign. See
Parker v. Brown, 80 Tex. 555, 557, 16 S.W. 262, 262 (1891). Since the veterans land board is
an instrumentality of the State of Texas, joinder of the veterans land board in the suit might
well have led to a determination that adverse possession could not be maintained against it.
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court also determined that although an interest in avoiding multiplicity of
litigation exists, the contract vendee failed to make a sufficient showing of
probable multiplicity of litigation that would require joinder of the veterans
land board.6 3
Dillon v. Hodges"4 discusses located and unlocated land certificates and
their effect on titles to Texas real estate. The plaintiffs in the suit instituted a
trespass to try title action to establish title. The United States Court of Ap-
peal for the Fifth Circuit, after reviewing Texas law on the issue, upheld the
district court's judgment that all of the disputants were tenants in com-
mon.65 The story in this case commenced with the issuance of a land certifi-
cate in 1909 containing a legal description of the land in question. Various
mesne conveyances followed thereafter until the property was conveyed to a
trustee. The parties in the case stipulated that the trustee took whatever
rights he acquired in trust for six parties who each owned an undivided one-
sixth interest in the property. Subsequently, the trustee filed a notice of ter-
mination of trusteeship and made the final payment of deferred purchase
consideration to the State of Texas whereupon a patent as to the land was
granted in the name of one of the predecessors in title to the trustee.
The plaintiffs argued that the original land certificate was personal prop-
erty that did not convey title to real property, that legal title to the land was
not conveyed to anyone until the patent issued from the state, that title had
vested in the original trustee after termination of the trust, and that the bene-
ficiaries of the former trust did not receive an interest in the land because no
title vested in the trustee prior to the issuance of the patent. 66 The defend-
ants argued that all of the disputants were tenants in common inasmuch as
the land certificate operated to segregate the land, that the certificate consti-
tuted an interest in realty, and that upon termination of the trust, equitable
title to the real estate had vested in all of the beneficiaries of the trust.
Applying Texas law, the appellate court noted that land certificates are
either located or unlocated, the determination being dependent upon
whether the specific land in question had been surveyed and the survey at-
tached to the certificate. 67 Unlocated land certificates vest no interest in
land, while located land certificates have the opposite effect and create a real
property interest. 68 Thus, once land has been surveyed and located, the
owners of the located certificate have property rights, including the right to
bring a trespass to try title action as between parties with competing inter-
The court did not deal with the issue of what would happen if the contract vendee subse-
quently defaulted on his contract for deed and the equitable title vested in him reverted to the
veterans land board. Parker suggests that title would be revested in the state, free of the claim
of the adverse possessor. 80 Tex. at 557, 16 S.W.2 at 262.
63. 722 S.W.2d at 12.
64. 804 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 1385.
66. Id. at 1387.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Sledge v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 340 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1960, no writ); Wantland v. Cowdin, 87 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1935, writ dism'd)).
19881
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ests, and any priority issues are to be determined as of the date of location of
the land and not from the date of issuance of a patent.69 The court also
noted that the owner of a located certificate does not lose his interest in the
property by virtue of the fact that another person might pay any remaining
unpaid purchase money to the State of Texas and have a patent issued in its
name, because the patent benefits the true owner of the land in such a cir-
cumstance. 70 Similarly, the court noted that Texas law clearly provides that
when a certificate is owned by more than one person and insufficient evi-
dence exists to identify any particular parcel as being for the exclusive bene-
fit of a particular owner, then the land will be treated as being held for the
benefit of all as tenants in common. 7' The court, in applying the foregoing
principles, found that the parties' interests must be determined with refer-
ences to priority of the location of the land, which occurred when the origi-
nal certificate was issued; therefore, all of the beneficiaries of the remote
trustee had an interest in the property and constituted tenants in common. 72
F. Lis Pendens
Moss v. Tennant73 dealt with the proper grounds for filing a notice of lis
pendens. A homeowner filed suit against the seller of the home alleging,
among other matters, breach of warranty, negligence, deceptive practices,
and fraud. He then filed a notice of lis pendens against a house subsequently
bought by the seller, seeking establishment of a constructive trust and claim-
ing an equitable interest in the new house to the extent it was purchased with
the proceeds he had paid to the seller for acquisition of the seller's old house.
The court found that the filing of the lis pendens was improper as the home-
owner was not trying to recover title to the new house nor claiming an inter-
est therein except in the nature of security for the future recovery of
damages.74 The court found that the lis pendens was in effect a request for a
judgment lien and therefore did not come within the relevant statutory
provisions.75
G. Legislation
Two significant bills were enacted, which are mentioned here in brief, but
which will be applicable to any real estate practice, are House Bill No.
219376 which enacts the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in the State of
69. 804 F.2d at 1388.
70. Id. (citing Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Noel, 443 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. 1968); Abbott v. Gulf
Prod. Co., 100 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1936, writ dism'd)).
71. 804 F.2d at 1388 (citing Kirby v. Estell, 78 Tex. 426, 431, 14 S.W. 695, 696 (1890)).
72. 804 F.2d at 1388-89.
73. 722 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
74. Id. at 763.
75. Id. Section 12.007 of the Texas Property Code provides for the filing of a lis pendens
when an action involves "title to real property, the establishment of an interest in real prop-
erty, or the enforcement of an encumbrance against real property. ... TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 12.007(a) (Vernon 1984).
76. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, ch. 1004, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6805
(Vernon) (to be codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.01-.013).
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Texas and Senate Bill 56377 which enacts the new Texas Revised Limited
Partnership Act. Both of these statutes need to be reviewed in a depth that
is beyond the scope of this survey, but it is worth noting that the new Uni-
form Fraudulent Transfer Act provides that a regularly conducted, noncol-
lusive foreclosure sale will be deemed to constitute a transfer for reasonably
equivalent value and will not be subject to attack as a fraudulent conveyance
under the state statute.78
House Bill 188179 adds a new section 35.53 to the Texas Business and
Commerce Code dealing with choice of law provisions in written contracts.
The provision applies to a contract if any element of the execution of the
contract occurs in Texas and one of the parties to the contract is either an
individual resident of Texas or an association or corporation created under
the laws of Texas or having its principal place of business in Texas.80 If
these requisites are met and the contract contains a provision making the
contract or any conflict arising thereunder subject to the laws of another
state, to litigation in the courts of another state, or to arbitration in another
state, then the provision must be set out in boldface print; otherwise, the
provision is voidable by the party sought to be charged. 81 Unfortunately,
the legislative draftsman used the term "boldface print" without defining it
in the statute, thus creating ambiguity as to what exactly constitutes bold-
face print. Those parties typing contracts on equipment other than modem
word processors may find this a difficult provision with which to comply.
Senate Bill No. 107582 specifically prohibits any person other than a li-
censed attorney from charging or receiving, directly or indirectly, any com-
pensation for the preparation of a legal instrument affecting title to real
property, including deeds, mortgages, and transfers and releases of liens. 83
The Act contains provisions permitting attorneys to utilize secretarial and
paralegal help and specifically does not prevent a person from completing
lease or rental forms that have been prepared by a licensed attorney or prop-
erty owner.84 The Act is also inapplicable to a licensed real estate broker or
salesman performing the acts of a real estate broker pursuant to provisions
of the Texas Real Estate License Act.8 5 The Act specifically provides for
recovery of fees paid and damages equal to three times the amount of the
fees paid plus recovery of court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.8 6 These
77. Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act, ch. 49, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 187
(Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1).
78. 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 6805.
79. Act of June 19, 1987, ch. 812, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5642 (Vernon) (to be
codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.53).
80. 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 5642-43.
81. Id. at 5643.
82. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 1080, § 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7408 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 320f, §§ 1-5 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
83. 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 7408-09.
84. Id.
85. Id. The Texas Real Estate License Act is found at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
§ 6573a (Vernon Supp. 1988).
86. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 1080, § 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7409 (Vernon).
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remedies are cumulative of other remedies available.87
II. BROKERS
Claims by brokers gave rise to several cases during the Survey period. In
Elin v. Neal 88 the court dealt with the applicability of the statute of frauds
provisions contained in the Texas Real Estate License Act89 to a licensed
attorney. The attorney had sued to collect a real estate commission allegedly
due based upon an oral agreement to obtain federally guaranteed financing
for certain apartment projects. The attorney claimed that the developer had
agreed to pay compensation for assistance in locating financing. The devel-
oper denied the existence any agreement and alleged, in the alternative, that
even if such an agreement existed, the failure of the parties to reduce it to
writing resulted in unenforceability. The trial court granted the developer's
motion for directed verdict based upon the provisions of the Texas Real Es-
tate License Act requiring that an action brought for recovery of a real estate
transaction commission be evidenced by a written agreement. 9° Although
the appellate court found the developer's arguments for application of the
statute of frauds provision to attorneys compelling, the court nonetheless
followed the unambiguous language of the statute and held that an attorney
is totally exempted from the provisions of the Texas Real Estate License
Act, including the statute of frauds provision. 91
The interpretation of a lease in connection with a claim for commission on
a sale of property was the subject matter of Campagna v. Lisotta.92 A broker
had negotiated a lease agreement and received a commission. The lease also
provided that if the property was sold to the lessee pursuant to a specific
provision of the lease, then the lessor owed the broker a further commission.
The lease provision in question granted an option to the lessee to acquire the
property, but the provision should more properly be classified as a right of
first refusal. 93 Subsequently, the lessor sold the property in question to the
lessee directly, and the broker sued for a commission. The court of civil
appeals, applying the strict language of the lease, noted that the lease stated
that if the property was sold pursuant to the terms of the option provisions
of the lease, then the lessor owed the broker the commission. 94 Referring to
the specific provision of the lease, the court found that the property had not
been sold subsequent to receiving a bona fide offer from a third party as
required by the provisions of the lease, and that, accordingly, the broker had
87. Id.
88. 720 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
89. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
90. 720 S.W.2d at 225.
91. Id. (citing TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988)). The
court also relied on Young v. Del Mar Homes, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston (14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the court found that a real estate sales-
man was exempted from the same statute of frauds provision by virtue of the provisions of
§ 3(f) of the Texas Real Estate License Act. 720 S.W.2d at 226.
92. 730 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).




not earned a commission under the express terms of the lease.95 The court
also rejected the broker's claim for a commission under a theory of quantum
meruit, applying the statute of frauds provision in the Texas Real Estate
License Act to defeat the broker's claim. 96
In Meisler v. Smith 97 the Fifth Circuit discussed the requirements for re-
covery of a brokerage commission based upon a broker's obligation to find a
purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to buy property. The owners of an
apartment project had executed a listing agreement with a broker providing
for payment of a commission if, during the term of the agreement, the broker
produced a purchaser who was ready, willing, and able to buy the property
at a price and at terms agreeable to the owner. The broker subsequently
delivered to the owners five separate earnest money contracts for acquisition
of the property on varying terms. Each of those contracts, however, con-
tained what is commonly termed a free look provision in the real estate in-
dustry. These provisions allowed the purchasers to terminate the contract
without liability in the event they were not satisfied, in their own discretion,
with the status of the property. The apartment owners responded to the
contracts by sending back a list of other conditions they wished to have in-
cluded in the contract. Some of the original offerees did not respond to the
list of questions, others made counteroffers that were not acceptable, but
ultimately the owners of the projects entered into a contract containing a
free look provision with one of the original offerees. That offeree, however,
subsequently terminated the contract under its free look provision. The bro-
ker then brought suit, claiming that he was entitled to a commission under
the contractual language. At trial the jury found that four of the five pro-
spective purchasers satisfied the ready, willing, and able condition, and the
district court therefore entered judgment in favor of the broker for his com-
mission plus attorney's fees. 98
The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment.99 The court first
noted that a Texas court would award a commission if the broker and buyer
have an enforceable contract of sale, even if the transaction thereafter does
not close, unless language to the contrary exists in the relevant agreement. 00
Applying the basic rule to this case, the court rejected the owner's argument
that a consummated sale was required for the broker to earn the commission
since the language of the listing agreement did not so provide. 101 In so hold-
ing, the court also rejected a contention by the owners that provisions in the
contracts providing that commissions would be payable upon closing of the
transaction would supercede the listing agreement. 10 2 The court then con-
sidered whether obtaining earnest money contracts with free look provisions
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
97. 814 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1987).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1076.
100. Id. at 1078 (citing Hoyt R. Matise Co. v. Zurn, 754 F.2d 560, 566 (5th Cir. 1985)).




satisfied the broker's obligation to provide a purchaser ready, willing, and
able to close. Reviewing Texas law on the issue, the court held that a con-
tract containing a free look provision creates an inference that the purchaser
is not ready, willing, and able to close, and that unless the broker rebuts this
inference by competent evidence, the broker is unable to recover.' 0 3 The
court found that the evidence introduced at trial was not sufficient to over-
come the inference in respect of the contracts that were not executed. 1"4 As
to the contract that was executed, the broker alleged that the buyer failed to
close because of a title defect, but the court found this argument unpersua-
sive since the buyer specifically linked the notice of termination to the free
look provision of the contract rather than to the provisions of the contract
dealing with title defects.' 0 5 The court accordingly reversed the district
court and entered judgment in favor of the owners.10 6
III. HOMESTEADS
In the homestead area interesting case law and legislative developments
occurred during the Survey period. In Johnson v. Cherry10 7 the Texas
Supreme Court once again dealt with the question of whether a deed abso-
lute on its face was actually an impermissible mortgage on a homestead. A
landowner, in dire financial straits and unable to borrow money, executed on
the same day a deed conveying land that included his homestead, a one-year
leaseback of the land, and an option to repurchase the land. In return, the
purchaser advanced money to the landowner and assumed certain of the
landowner's indebtedness. The exercise of the option was conditioned on the
landowner making two semi-annual payments of rent under the lease. The
landowner subsequently failed to make one of these payments, whereupon
the purchaser instituted eviction proceedings, which in turn led to counter-
claims from the landowner claiming that the transaction was a loan, and
alleging usurious interest and other matters.
The Texas Supreme Court noted that the question of whether an instru-
ment that, on its face, constitutes a deed is actually a mortgage is a question
of fact, and that even though the instrument appears on its face to be abso-
lute, parol evidence is admissible to show the parties' true intent. 0 8 The
court found that the landowner had introduced sufficient evidence at trial to
support the jury's finding that the parties intended the instrument as a mort-
103. Id. at 1080. The apartment owners relied primarily on Moss & Raley v. Wren, 102
Tex. 567, 570, 120 S.W. 847 (1909) (purchaser entering contract that allows him to refuse to
take the property is not ready, willing, and able), while the broker relied primarily on
Hamburger & Dreyling v. Thomas, 103 Tex. 280, 283, 126 S.W. 561 (1910) (broker is entitled
to commission upon execution of option contract even if the sale fails to close later due to
failure to produce good title). 814 F.2d at 1080.
104. 814 F.2d at 1082.
105. Id. at 1082-83.
106. Id. at 1083.
107. 726 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1987).
108. Id. at 6 (citing Wilbanks v. Wilbanks, 160 Tex. 317, 318-19, 330 S.W.2d 607, 608
(1960); Wells v. Hilburn, 129 Tex. 11, 15-16, 98 S.W.2d 177, 180 (1936)).
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gage rather than an absolute conveyance.'19 The court also held that when a
deed constitutes a mortgage, equity requires the mortgagor to offer to repay
the indebtedness in question. The court accordingly found the landowner
indebted for the funds advanced and granted the lender a lien on the portion
of the land in question that did not constitute the landowner's homestead. 110
In re Niland I I ' delineates the risks of lending against collateral that may
constitute homestead property and the lengths to which Texas law will ex-
tend to protect the holder of a homestead, even in the face of deplorable
conduct. The debtor in the case had on several occasions financed property
that was ultimately determined to be his homestead to obtain funds for use
in business. In connection with each loan the debtor signed affidavits stating
that a different piece of property was his homestead. In the final loan trans-
action, in addition to executing a false affidavit, he also paid a bribe to a loan
officer of the lending institution. The debtor, however, was occupying the
subject property at the time that the various affidavits were executed. On
another occasion the debtor successfully persuaded a judgment creditor to
release a lien against a condominium unit that was not the subject of the case
at hand, alleging that this unit was his homestead. After experiencing finan-
cial difficulty, the debtor first tried to sell the property, but the property was
posted for foreclosure and another party bought the property at foreclosure
sale, receiving a substitute trustee's deed. The debtor failed to vacate the
premises following foreclosure, and the purchaser at the foreclosure sale in-
stituted proceedings to obtain possession. The debtor then filed for bank-
ruptcy protection. In the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor successfully
avoided the foreclosure, alleging that the property in question had been his
homestead and that the liens were improper." 2
The Fifth Circuit held that the property was a homestead because the
debtor had occupied the property, more or less continuously, for more than
fifteen years. 1 3 The court noted that, under Texas law, homestead status is
presumed to continue once established, and that the burden is upon the
party claiming that no homestead exists to so prove. 14 The court next ad-
dressed the issue of whether the debtor was estopped from claiming the
homestead as such in light of his numerous fraudulent activities. The court
found that Texas law clearly does not provide for estoppel in this sort of
case, as to allow the estoppel argument to prevail based upon affidavits and
other agreements obtained by lenders would permit the protection afforded
109. 726 S.W.2d at 7. The facts adduced at trial included testimony that the repurchase
price was 10% more than the original price, that the property was worth almost double the
sale price, and that the lease payments equalled 18% interest on the purchase price; further-
more, the landowner had told a real estate agent shortly before the sale that he was not inter-
ested in listing his property for sale.
110. Id. at 8. The Texas Legislature has adopted a new section to the Property Code deal-
ing specifically with the issues raised in Johnson v. Cherry. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.006
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
111. 825 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1987).
112. Niland v. Deason, 50 Bankr. 468, 478 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
113. 825 F.2d at 806-07.
114. Id. at 808 (citing McFarland v. Rousseau, 667 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, no writ)).
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by the homestead statutes to be easily avoided."5 The court characterized
this rule as being "based on a recognition that many in financial difficulties
will sign anything to obtain money from lenders" and went on to note that is
exactly what had happened in the case at hand." 6 Accordingly, the court
rejected the arguments of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, distinguish-
ing the cases cited by the purchaser that had dealt with estoppel in the
homestead circumstances.' 17
Having found that the property constituted the debtor's homestead and
that he was not estopped from so claiming, the court examined the claims of
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale as against the lender holding the liens
foreclosed upon. The court found no breach of warranty, since the warranty
in the substitute trustee's deed ran from the owner of the property, the
debtor, to the purchaser and not from the lender. 1 8 The court also found
no basis for the imposition of a constructive trust given the facts of the
case.11 9 The court next turned to the claims of the purchaser for warranty
and fraud against the debtor and found that no valid warranty claim existed
since invalid liens on a homestead are void and foreclosure of such a lien
cannot create a warranty obligation.1 20 In so holding, the court reiterated
the general rule that bidders in a foreclosure sale in Texas purchase at their
own risk.' 2 ' The court also rejected an argument that an equitable lien
should be placed against the homestead property, since such a lien would
circumvent the Texas homestead protections.1 22 The court next addressed
the issue of designating a one-acre homestead site out of the 1.5417-acre
property in question and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court so that
the debtor could make such a designation. 123 The court awarded the pur-
chaser at the foreclosure sale title to the remaining .5417 acres, as well as
rights of subrogation to the previous lender's rights against the debtor under
the note and deed of trust previously foreclosed upon, a rather hollow right
in light of the bankruptcy of the debtor and the invalidity of the lien securing
the debt. 124
The legislature enacted four significant statutes dealing with homesteads
during the survey period. House Bill 2024125 codified the holding of the
Texas Supreme Court in Johnson v. Cherry12 6 by adding a new section
41.006 to the Texas Property Code. The new section specifies that any sale
115. Id. at 808-09 (citing Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock, 76 Tex. 85, 89, 13 S.W. 12, 13
(1890)).
116. Id. at 809.
117. Id. (citing Lincoln v. Bennett, 138 Tex. 56, 61-62 156 S.W.2d 504, 506-07 (1941)).
118. Id. at 811-12.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 813.
121. Id. at 813-14 (citing Henke v. First Southern Properties, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 617, 620
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
122. Id. at 814.
123. Id. at 815-16.
124. Id.
125. Act of June 19, 1987, ch. 1130, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7771 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.006 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
126. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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of a homestead at a fixed price less than the appraised fair market value of
the property in which the buyer leases the property back to the seller at
rental payments exceeding the fair rental value of the property will be
deemed a loan, and that all payments made by the seller to the buyer in
excess of the sales price will be reclassified as interest. 127 The legislature
provided that such a transaction is a deceptive trade practice, that the deed
is void, and that no lien attaches to the homestead as a result of the alleged
sale. 128 The statute is inapplicable to the sale of a family homestead among
family members as defined by the act. 129
House Bill 275130 adds a new section 41.005 to the Texas Property Code
requiring home improvement contracts creating an encumbrance on home-
stead property to contain a conspicuously printed warning at least equal to
ten point bold type or the computer equivalent to be located next to the
owner's signature line on each document.13' The specific provisions of the
required notice are set out in the statute and a failure to include the warning
constitutes a deceptive trade practice. 132
House Bill 710133 also adds a section 41.005 to the Texas Property Code,
providing for the voluntary designation of homestead by filing a written
designation with the county clerk of the county where the property is located
complying with the provisions of the statute.134 The designation must con-
tain a statement that the parties executing the instrument are designating
property as a homestead, the name of the original grantee of the property
and, of course, a description of the property so designated. 135
Senate Bill No. 21136 revises section 11.13 of the Tax Code to make clear
that a homestead may consist of an indirect interest in real property through
ownership of stock in a corporation incorporated under the Cooperative As-
sociation Act. 137
127. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.006 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
128. Id.
129. Id. The Property Code defines family members to which the act does not apply as "a
parent, stepparent, grandparent, child, stepchild, brother, half brother, sister, half sister, or
grandchild of an adult member of the family." Id. § 41.00 6 (c).
130. Act of May 19, 1987, ch. 116, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 556 (Vernon) (codified at
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.005 (Vernon Supp. 1988)). House Bill 710, discussed infra note
133-35 and accompanying text, also adds a new § 41.005 to the Texas Property Code, a mis-
take that the codifiers will no doubt sort out.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 727, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5226 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.005 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
134. Id. The legislature's enactment of two sections 41.005 was apparently an accident.
See supra note 130.
135. 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 5226-27. Query what is meant by the "original
grantee"-the original patentee from the state, the immediate seller to the party filing, or
someone else?
136. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 547, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4407 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.13(o)-(p) (Vernon Supp. 1988)). The Cooperative Association
Act is found at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-50.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988).




Two interesting cases arose in the field of eminent domain during the Sur-
vey period. FDIC v. Texas Electric Service Co. 138 dealt with the right to a
condemnation award as between competing lienholders. The condemnor
took a small parcel out of a larger tract encumbered by both first and second
liens. The entire award was paid over to the first lienholder and the second
lienholder appealed, arguing that, upon a partial taking, a mortgagee is enti-
tled to receive only that portion of the condemnation award as would com-
pensate him for the impairment of his security. 139 The first lienholder's
mortgage provided for partial releases of lien upon payment of a specified
amount per acre. Payment of this amount in relation to the land condemned
would have constituted approximately one-fifth of the total award. Evidence
at the trial, however, indicated that the value of the entire tract had de-
creased and was continuing to decrease. The court of appeals upheld the
trial court's judgment awarding the entire condemnation award to the first
lienholder, holding that the evidence supported the finding that the remain-
ing value of the property was too little to assure repayment of both debts.140
Leeco Gas & Oil Co. v. County of Nueces 14 1 involved an attempt by a
county to condemn the reversionary right to property being used as a public
park. A grantor had deeded land to a county for use as a park, retaining a
reversionary interest such that the property would revert to the grantor if a
park were not constructed and maintained by the county. The county main-
tained the property as a park, but then instituted condemnation proceedings
against the reversionary interest. At trial, the court awarded the original
grantor nominal damages for its reversionary estate. 142
The Texas Supreme Court first dealt with the grantor's argument that the
county was estopped from condemning the property by acceptance of the
deed with the reversion provision. The court, rejecting this argument, noted
that acquisition of land to maintain a park is a governmental function and
held that a governmental body exercising governmental powers is not subject
to the doctrine of estoppel.143 The court then noted that a possibility of
reverter generally has no value that can be measured when the event that
would cause the reversion is not likely to occur within a reasonably short
period of time.44 The supreme court noted that the trial court had relied on
other decisions in reaching its holding, but distinguished these decisions
since they related to competing claims for condemnation awards as between
the owner of a possessory interest and the owner of a future interest in the
subject property.' 45 The court therefore noted that, constitutionally, con-
138. 723 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1986, no writ).
139. Id. at 771. The appellant relied upon Buell Realty Note Collection Trust v. Central
Oak Inv. Co., 483 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
140. 723 S.W.2d at 772.
141. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 562 (July 8, 1987).
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex. 1970)).
144. Id.
145. Id. The trial court relied on Sabine River Auth. v. Willis, 369 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex.
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demnors of land must adequately compensate the landowner, and that the
minimal award in this case was not adequate as a matter of law. 146 The
court went on to hold "that when a governmental entity is the grantee in a
gift deed in which the grantor retains a reversionary interest, if that same
governmental entity condemns the reversionary interest, it must pay as com-
pensation the amount by which the value of the unrestricted fee exceeds the
value of the restricted fee."' 147
V. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Issues concerning interpretation and enforcement of restrictive covenants
were fertile ground for litigation during the Survey period. As is generally
the case in restriction cases, the individual fact situations were often determi-
native. In Wilmoth v. Wilcox 148 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a double-wide manufactured home placed upon a lot
violated restrictive covenants prohibiting house trailers. The lot owners
moved a new double-wide manufactured home onto a lot, removed the
wheels, placed a covering around the perimeter, and added a porch. Other
lot owners brought suit for the removal of the home, alleging that its pres-
ence violated restrictive covenants affecting the property, and succeeded at
trial. The court of civil appeals reversed, however. 149 The Texas Supreme
Court, after discussing the basic rules applicable to enforcing and interpret-
ing restrictive covenants,' 50 addressed the issue of whether an older restric-
tive covenant prohibiting house trailers was meant to exclude manufactured
housing. The court concluded that the intention of the covenants was to
restrict any kind of house trailer, mobile home, or manufactured home, how-
ever denominated, and accordingly affirmed the judgment of the trial
court. I5'
Tanglewood Homes Association v. Henke 152 points out the importance that
a severability clause can have in a suit to enforce restrictive covenants. A
homeowner's association had brought suit alleging that a homeowner had
1963), and City of Houston v. McCarthy, 464 S.W.2d 381, 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (possibility of reverter has only nominal value).
146. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 563.
147. Id. In a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Robertson and Kilgarlin, Justice
Campbell indicated that he would hold that if a governmental body accepts a gift deed grant-
ing a determinable fee interest, institution of condemnation proceedings by the grantee against
the reversionary interest would constitute a renunciation of the gift. Id. at 563-64 (Campbell,
J., concurring). Under both the majority and the concurring view governmental authorities
should be dissuaded from trying to accept gifts of park land and then subsequently condemn-
ing the reversionary interest for nominal value.
148. 734 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
149. Id. at 657. The restrictive covenants provided that "[n]o building, house, or cabin
shall be moved onto any lot in this addition from other locations unless they are new construc-
tion .... No tents, house trailers or temporary structures shall be permitted to remain on any
lot for more than 30 days." Id.
150. Id. at 657-58.
151. Id. at 658 (citing Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. 1977); Gigowski v.
Russell, 718 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bullock v. Kattner, 502
S.W.2d 828, 829-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
152. 728 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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constructed certain improvements in violation of the applicable restrictive
covenants. The trial court had denied injunctive relief and the association
appealed. The record reflected that the restrictive covenants in question had
been recorded in 1950, that by their terms they were for the purpose of car-
rying out a uniform plan for the subdivision, and that reference to the re-
strictions was contained in the deeds conveying the property in question. 15 3
The restrictive covenants also contained a severability clause.' 54 The home-
owner had made several additions to his home adding a chimney, a new
room, a spa, and a pool equipment room that violated various setback line
restrictions imposed by the restrictive covenants. At trial, the jury affirma-
tively answered special issues to the effect that the restrictive covenants had
been abandoned with regard to building setback lines and the height of
fences and the trial court had entered judgment based thereon.' 55
On appeal the association did not challenge the finding concerning the
fence height restriction, but contested the holding that the building setback
lines had been abandoned. The court of civil appeals noted that the restric-
tions dealt with setback requirements in two different provisions, one appli-
cable to the main residence built on a lot and the other applicable to
attached garages and out buildings.156 The court found sufficient evidence
introduced at trial to support the finding that the setback requirements with
regard to garages and out buildings had been abandoned, as fifteen homes
out of fifty-six in the section in question had attached garages or carports
that materially violated the setback line requirement. The court accordingly
upheld the jury's finding that the setback restriction with regard to these
types of structures had been waived. 57 The court, however, found the evi-
dence insufficient to support the finding that the setback requirements con-
cerning main residences had been waived, since the record reflected that only
five homes violated this restriction, with the range of violation from 5 inches
to 13.8 inches.' 58 Taking into account the severability provision, the court
held that the waiver of the setback provision as to garages and out buildings
did not constitute a waiver of the separate provision applicable to main resi-
dences.' 59 The appellants had also alleged that the restrictive covenants did
not establish a general plan for development since, pursuant to the express
153. Id. at 41.
154. Id. The severability clause provided "and if any one of such restrictions shall be held
to be invalid, or for any reason is not enforced, none of the others shall be affected or impaired
thereby, but shall remain in full force and effect." Id.
155. 728 S.W.2d at 42-43.
156. Id. at 43.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 43-44.
159. Id. The court applied the following standard: "To establish abandonment, a party
must prove that the violations are so great as to lead the mind of the average man to reason-
ably conclude that the restriction in question has been abandoned." Id. (citing Cowling v.
Colligan, 158 Tex. 458, 461-62, 312 S.W.2d 943, 945-46 (1958)). The court also noted that the
factors to be taken into account in determining if a violation has occurred are "the number,
nature, and severity of the then existing violation, any prior acts of enforcement of the restric-
tion, and whether it is still possible to realize to a substantial degree the benefits intended
through the covenant." Id. (quoting New Jerasulem Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Houston,
598 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ)).
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provisions of the restrictions, the association had power to modify them,
preventing the imposition of a general plan. The court of civil appeals de-
clined to deal with this issue, since the appellants did not allege that the
association had applied its discretionary powers.160 The court noted that the
existence of a power to modify a restrictive covenant does not render it unen-
forceable, and, applying the severability clause, noted that this provision
could be deleted from the covenants without destroying their entire effect.'61
The homeowner finally argued that the court should balance the parties'
equities and that he should not be required to remove the improvements,
taking into consideration the detriment to him and the probable benefit to
the association and other owners. The court rejected this argument as well,
noting that one who seeks equity must do equity.162 The court pointed out
that the association had expressly advised the homeowner of the potential
violations in meetings and in letters but that, nonetheless, the homeowner
had continued with construction, indeed quickening the pace of construction
after receipt of a letter specifying the violations in question.' 63
Homsey v. University Gardens Racquet Club 16 involved a dispute con-
cerning restrictive covenants requiring payment of dues and assessments for
membership in a racquet club. A homeowner bought a lot in a subdivision
encumbered by recorded restrictive covenants that required owners to pay
dues and assessments to a racquet club. The owner refused to pay, and the
owners association obtained a summary judgment for the dues and assess-
ments. The homeowner appealed, alleging that he did not have notice of the
restrictions in question, the covenant was not reasonable and was not for the
exclusive use and benefit of lot owners, and that, by failing to enforce the
covenant, the association had waived the covenant. 65
The court of civil appeals first dealt with the argument that the covenant
did not touch and concern the land in question. The gravamen of the
owner's argument was that the exclusivity of the racquet club had been de-
stroyed because it had been opened to the public, provided that new public
members were approved by a board of directors and that such members paid
an initiation fee. The court of appeals noted that the main element in deter-
mining whether a covenant touches and concerns land is whether its relation
to the property is such as to increase in value and confer benefits on the
owners.' 66 The court then found that the covenant in question benefited lot
owners and further conferred benefits not available to members of the gen-
eral public because lot owners within the subdivision paid no initiation fee
and the board of directors did not approve their membership.' 67 Accord-
160. Id. at 46.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 49.
163. Id.
164. 730 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
165. Id. at 764.
166. Id. (citing Prochemco, Inc. v. Clajon Gas Co., 555 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
167. Id. at 765.
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ingly, the court found the homeowner's argument unpersuasive. 68 The
court next addressed the waiver issue and found that the restrictive cove-
nants had not been waived since the only evidence adduced at trial was the
fact that the homeowner's bringing the suit had not been charged the dues
and assessments while he was the owner of a different lot in the subdivi-
sion. 169 The court found that this single incident was not sufficient to sus-
tain the burden of proving waiver. ' 70 Since the homeowner had constructive
knowledge of the restriction in question, the court of civil appeals upheld the
summary judgment granted in favor of the association. 171
Independent American Real Estate v. Davis 172 involved questions concern-
ing whether restrictive covenants had been waived or rendered ineffective as
to a border lot. Developers brought suit seeking to declare that due to
changed conditions certain restrictive covenants restricting the use of their
property to single-family residences were no longer enforceable. The devel-
opers owned a large tract that was on the outside border of the subdivision
affected by the restrictions. The evidence supporting the developers' motion
for summary judgment consisted of the affidavits of two appraisers stating
that the value of the developers' property would significantly increase if the
restrictive covenants were removed and that the deed restrictions were no
longer necessary to protect the interior lots of the subdivision nor would
their removal reduce the value of the lots. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the homeowners. 173
On appeal, the developers argued that the summary judgment was im-
proper since, due to changed conditions, the deed restrictions no longer se-
cured their initial intended benefits. The court of civil appeals rejected this
as a matter of law, finding that the matters alleged by the developers did not
amount to changed conditions and that the deed restrictions still did obtain
their intended benefits.174 The court of civil appeals also noted that a change
in zoning permitting commercial development on the property in question
did not abrogate the plan of development or the restrictions. 75
The court addressed the release of certain restrictive covenants in L. R.
French v. Diamond Hill-Jarvis Civic League.176 A lot owner sought a declar-
atory judgment that certain restrictive covenants had been released and no




171. Id. at 746-765.
172. 735 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
173. Id. at 258.
174. Id. at 260-61. The court noted that the developers did not introduce adequate evi-
dence of changed conditions. The original developers had apparently anticipated that the city
would widen the boundary road in question. The church, although owning the unrestricted
lot, did not build on the lot. No owners of restricted lots engaged in commercial development,
even though other persons established commercial properties across the street from the re-
stricted area.
175. Id. at 260 (citing Lebo v. Johnson, 349 S.W.2d 744, 751-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
176. 724 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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covenants were still in effect. 177 The court of appeals, applying the language
of the covenants, found that a majority of the owners of the affected lots had
voted to release the restrictive covenants and that a majority vote of the
owners of the lots was unnecessary. 178 The court expressly found that the
provisions of the restrictive covenants allowing a specified percentage of
owners to amend the covenants in whole or in part included the right to
completely release or abolish the covenants.1 79 Finally, the court found that
the owners, in circulating releases of the covenants for execution, satisfied
the requirement that a majority vote of owners occur, since no reason existed
for a prior circulation of a petition.'8 0
In Rosas v. Bursey 18 1 a homebuyer bought a vacant lot and sought to
move a house on it. Adjoining lot owners brought suit to enforce the restric-
tive covenants affecting the lot requiring that plans for improvements be sub-
mitted for prior approval. The homebuyer subsequently submitted plans
that were approved. The parties entered into a written settlement agreement
that recited that the restrictive covenants encumbered the homebuyer's lot
and provided for completion of the external improvements as to the new
house within a ninety day period. The homebuyer then moved the house on
the lot but failed to perform all external improvements within the ninety day
period. The adjoining lot owners again brought suit seeking to enforce the
settlement agreement and to require removal of the improvements from the
property in accordance with the terms of the agreement. In upholding the
trial court's judgment requiring removal of the house and awarding attor-
neys' fees, the court of civil appeals found that the restrictive covenants were
in effect and encumbered the lot in question and had not been waived by
failure of enforcement based on summary judgment evidence presented.' 82
In Permian Basin Centers for Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Al-
sobrook 183 a group acquired a home in a subdivision for use as a family
home for six mentally retarded adults and two house parents. Another
homeowner in the addition brought suit to enjoin such use, alleging that
such use would violate the restrictive covenants affecting the property. 184
The court of civil appeals, applying the facts to the language of the restric-
tive covenants, found that the covenants in question restricted only the na-
177. Id. at 922.
178. Id. at 923. The covenants in question provided as follows: "These covenants and
restrictions are to run with the land and shall be binding on all parties and all persons claiming
under them until JANUARY 1, 1985, at which time said covenants shall be automatically
extended for successive periods; of ten years unless by a vote of a majority of the then owners
of the lots it is agreed to change said covenants in whole or in part." Id.
179. Id. at 924 (citing Couch v. Southern Methodist Univ., 10 S.W.2d 973, 973-74 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1928, judgmt adopted). But see Hanchett v. East Sunnyside Civic League, 696
S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
180. 724 S.W.2d at 924.
181. 724 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
182. Id. at 407.
183. 723 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
184. Id. at 775. The provision in question provided that "[n]o structures shall be erected,
altered, placed or permitted to remain on any residential building plot other than one detached
single-family dwelling, not to exceed two stories in height, and a private garage for not more
than two cars .... ." Id.
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ture of the structure to be erected on residential lots within the subdivision
and not the character of use, and therefore held that the proposed use would
not violate the restrictive covenant in question. 18 5
House Bill 356186 adds new chapters 202 and 203 to the Texas Property
Code, dealing with the construction and enforcement of restrictive covenants
and certain other matters. The statute applies to all restrictive covenants,
even those created prior to enactment. 18 7 The more important provisions in
the act are a requirement that restrictive covenants be liberally construed to
give effect to their purposes and intents, that an exercise of discretionary
authority by an owners association will be presumed reasonable unless a
court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the exercise was
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory, and, that the county attorney is au-
thorized to enforce restrictive covenants in counties with a population of
more than two million people.1 8
VI. EASEMENTS AND ROADS
Rutten v. Cazey 18 9 dealt with the obligation of the grantee of an easement
to perform certain activities. The grantors had granted an access easement
that expressly provided that the grantee would build and maintain a fence,
gates, and cattle guards. The grantee evidently failed to do this, and when
the grantor sued, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the grantor
for the costs to effect necessary repairs. 190 The grantee argued that the ease-
ment, which was in writing and had been recorded, did not satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds, evidently because the grantee had not executed or expressly
accepted the easement. The court of civil appeals rejected this argument,
noting that the grantee by accepting a warranty deed is bound by its provi-
sions even though the grantee has not executed the deed. 19 1 The court found
that the same rule is applicable to an easement as an interest in land. 192
Vrazel v. Skrabanek 193 dealt with questions concerning prescriptive ease-
ments and estoppel. The owner of several lots upon which a dirt road was
located changed the locks to the gate to the road, thereby denying a lessee
access to a separate parcel. The lessee brought suit for damages incurred
due to his inability to reach the leased parcel, pleading a right to use the road
by virtue of rights of prescription. The trial court rendered judgment for the
185. Id. at 776-77. The court of civil appeals found the case analogous to Collins v. City of
El Campo, 684 S.W.2d 756, 761-62 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But
see Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
186. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 712, § 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5171 (to be codified at TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 202.001-.005, 203.001-.005)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 734 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, no writ).
190. Id. at 753.
191. Id. at 755.
192. Id. (citing Greene v. White, 137 Tex. 361, 386-87, 153 S.W.2d 575, 589 (1941); Wall v.
Lower Colo. River Auth., 536 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
193. 725 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1987).
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lessee, but the court of civil appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed that
judgment. 194
The Texas Supreme Court first upheld the finding that no easement by
prescription existed as to the road since the lessee and his predecessors in
title had used the road with the consent of the lot owner. 195 However, it was
clear that the road in question had been in use for over fifty years and there
was also a dedicated easement that would provide access to the leased lot.
The dedicated easement was located to the east of the actual road and had
been obstructed by the lot owner. The supreme court found that the lot
owner had a duty to keep the dedicated easement free from interference,
which he had breached, that the location of the easement had been changed
with the consent of both parties to the actual road, and that once the ex-
change had occurred, the lot owner was estopped to deny the exchange.' 96
Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed
the judgment of the trial court.' 97
The court reviewed the authority of a county commissioners' court to
close a publicly dedicated road in Smith County v. Thornton.198 In deter-
mining that the county commissioners' court had power to close a portion of
a road, following proper compliance with the Open Meetings Act, 199 the
Texas Supreme Court noted that commissioners' courts generally possess the
power to open, alter, change, or abandon any public road. 2° ° This power is
limited, however, since the commissioners' court does not have the right to
close a public road or portion thereof over the protest of an owner of land
abutting the closed portion.20 1 When the owner's land abuts a publicly dedi-
cated road at other than the portion closed, however, the county commis-
sioners' court may close the road. 20 2 The owner's remedy is then a cause of
action for the diminishment in the value of the land caused by the impair-
ment of right of access.20
3
VII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Construction and Interpretation
In Pioneer Oil Co. v. Vallejo2° 4 the court considered whether or not a
194. Id. at 709.
195. Id. at 711 (citing Othen v. Rosier, 148 Tex. 485, 493, 226 S.W.2d 622, 626-27 (1950)).
The court also noted that since both the lot owner and the lessee had used the road, the lessee
did not meet the exclusivity requirement. Id. (citing Brooks v. Jones, 578 S.W.2d 669, 673
(Tex. 1979)).
196. 725 S.W.2d at 711-12 (citing Dortch v. Sherman County, 212 S.W.2d 1018, 1021
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948, no writ)).
197. Id. at 712.
198. 726 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1986).
199. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A(h) (Vernon Supp. 1988).





204. 736 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
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written contract constituted a lease. Landowners had entered into an agree-
ment styled "lease and operating agreement" with a convenience store oper-
ator. The agreement provided for installation and operation of self-service
gasoline pumps. The landowners, in the same agreement, agreed to sell gas-
oline, collect proceeds, and deposit the same for the account of the conven-
ience store operator. The agreement described the land in question and
provided for a term of five years with renewal rights. The landowners subse-
quently assigned their rights in the agreement, and the assignee desired to
install additional gas pumps, separate from those installed by the conven-
ience store operator. A dispute then arose as to whether the lease and oper-
ating agreement constituted a contractual arrangement for marketing of
gasoline or a true lease.
The court of civil appeals reversed the trial court and found that the
agreement clearly constituted a lease as it characterized itself as a lease, ade-
quately described the land in question, provided for rental, and otherwise
had the attributes of a lease.205 Having found that the agreement consti-
tuted a lease, the court also found that the tenant, the convenience store
operator, had been granted exclusive possession of the premises, and there-
fore had the exclusive right to use the premises, including the vending of
gasoline therefrom. 20 6
In Myers v. Ginsberg20 7 the court decided several issues arising out of a
dispute between a lessor and a lessee. The lessee removed certain property
from the leased premises and then defaulted in rent payments. After the
default, the lessee attempted to remove more equipment when the lessor ap-
peared and demanded that the removal of the equipment cease because it
was subject to a landlord's lien for rent. The lessor asked for and received
delivery of the keys to the premises. The lessor then took possession of the
equipment and neither returned it nor sold it. The lessor filed suit against
the lessee to recover arrearages of rent and certain tax and insurance premi-
ums that were required to be paid under the lease. The lessee counter-
claimed, alleging breach of the lease, conversion, and violation of the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. After trial, the court entered judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the lessor for recovery of rent, taxes,
and insurance premiums. 20 8
The court of civil appeals dealt with a series of issues raised on appeal by
the lessee. The court first addressed whether under the terms of the lease a
credit was required to be given against rent for the fair market value of the
equipment taken. The court held that the question of whether the lessor was
required to credit the value of the equipment against rent was a question of
law for the court's determination and that the trial court did not err in disre-
205. Id. at 229-30 (citing Holcombe v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446, 454, 79 S.W.2d 307, 310
(1935)).
206. Id. at 230 (citing Cleveland v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 126, 170 S.W.2d 472, 475-76
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1943, opinion adopted)).
207. 735 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
208. Id. at 602.
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garding the jury's finding as to this issue. 2° 9 The lessee next argued that he
was entitled to an offset against the amounts owed because the lessor, upon
seizing the equipment, was required to either sell the equipment and credit
to rent the net proceeds or credit the fair market value of the equipment.
The court disagreed with this particular contention in this context, charac-
terizing the lessee's claimed set-off right as being based upon an independent
claim for damages arising out of an independent cause of action, and, thus,
the lessee was not entitled to an automatic offset or credit until he had
proved the cause of action for damages. If successful on the damages ques-
tion, the lessee might be entitled to offset the judgment for the value of the
equipment against the lessor's judgment for rent.210 The lessee next argued
that a specific provision of the lease constituted a liquidated damage or pen-
alty clause.21 1 The court rejected this argument, applying traditional rules
of construction to find that the clause in question implemented the land-
lord's lien provisions of the lease by requiring that the lessee not remove its
property from the leased premises at a time when he was in default, and that
the clause did not constitute either a liquidated damages or penalty provi-
sion, nor did it provide for a contractual transfer of title upon termination of
the lease, as the lessor had alleged. 21 2
The court then turned to the question of whether the lessor had violated
the contractual provisions of the lease. The lessee had alleged that under
specific provisions of the lease the lessor could enter the premises only
through proper judicial procedures. The court, however, rejected this argu-
ment, finding that the lessor had not breached the lease, since another provi-
sion of the lease specifically provided for the lessor's entry upon the
premises, the lessor took no acts to expel the lessee, and the lessee delivered
the keys upon request, which constituted a surrender of the premises. 21 3
Similarly, the court held that removing the equipment without judicial pro-
cess did not constitute a conversion because the lessor had the express right
to do so under the terms of the lease. 21 4 The court, however, went on to
state that, although the lessor was authorized to take the equipment, he did
not have the right to take and hold the equipment indefinitely. 215 Since the
lessor was obligated to either dispose of the property by sale within a reason-
able period of time or credit the value of the property taken against amounts
owed, and since the lessor's failure to do either act might be sufficient to
support the lessee's counterclaim for conversion, the court remanded this
209. Id. (citing Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
210. Id. at 603.
21 1. Id. The provision relied upon by the lessee stated that "[a]t the expiration or termina-
tion of this lease, tenant shall have the right to remove such items so installed provided tenant
is not in default at the time of such removal ...." Id.
212. Id. at 603-04.
213. Id. at 604 (citing Edward Bankers & Co. v. Spradlin, 575 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ)).
214. Id. (citing Sunray Enterprises, Inc. v. Rosenaur, 335 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
215. Id. at 605.
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issue for new trial.216 The final issue addressed was whether the lessees had
stated a cause of action under the Deceptive Trade Practice Act.2 17 The
court noted that the transaction may be a violation of the Deceptive Trade
Practice Act, which provides that a representation that a contract provides
rights that it does not afford can form the basis for a cause of action. 218 On
this issue the court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a new
trial.2 1
9
United Interests, Inc. v. Brewington, Inc.220 illustrates the necessity for
clear drafting of lease provisions. The owner of an office building, who had
acquired the building subject to an existing master lease and subleases, noti-
fied a sublessee that it had leased a surface parking area to a third party for
other use and that the sublessee would no longer have access to the area.
The sublessee immediately brought suit for a declaratory judgment that it
was entitled to use the parking area under the specific provisions of its sub-
lease. 221 The court of civil appeals found that the language of the lease was
ambiguous, and that the trial court's admission of parol evidence was there-
fore proper to determine the parties' true intention. 222 The evidence intro-
duced at trial established that the sublessee had a right to use the parking
area in question.223 Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's order
enjoining the owner from interfering with the sublessee's use. 224
Plaza of the Americas, Ltd. v. Rodgers225 presented an interesting case
dealing with the effect of an approved bankruptcy reorganization plan on the
obligations of a lease guarantor. The corporate tenant, under a lease that
was guaranteed by an individual styled as an "insider" of the corporation,
filed for bankruptcy and eventually reorganized under a plan that claimed to
be a discharge of liability of the corporation and any of its insiders. The
court of appeals, however, found that since the guarantor had executed a
separate guaranty making it primarily liable for the tenant's obligations
under the lease, the guarantor was not discharged by the reorganization
plan.226 The bankruptcy plan affected the liability of the corporate tenant
and did not affect the guarantor's primary obligation under the separate
guaranty contract. 227
216. Id.
217. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act is found at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.41-.826 (Vernon 1987).
218. 735 S.W.2d at 605.
219. Id.
220. 729 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
221. The language of the provision in question provided that "[g]eneral parking shall be in
the front and on the north side of the general parking area, and there shall be no assigned
parking spaces provided for any Tenant in these areas." Id. at 900. The lease did not define
either general parking area or assigned parking spaces, and the provision had been copied from
a previous lease; the court found this sufficient support that the lease was ambiguous. Id. at
901-02.
222. Id. at 902.
223. Id. at 903-04.
224. Id. at 906-07.
225. 728 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
226. Id. at 829.
227. Id. One justice dissented on the theory that the lessor had brought the action in the
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In Alzo Advertising, Inc. v. Industrial Properties Corp.2 2 8 the court consid-
ered the construction of a written lease agreement. A subtenant proposed to
sublet a small portion of the premises in question for the purpose of erecting
and maintaining a billboard. Pursuant to provisions of the lease agreement,
the subtenant submitted plans and specifications for the billboard to the les-
sor for its approval. The lessor disapproved the plans, indicating that a bill-
board would not be permitted on the premises. The subtenant then
instituted action seeking judgment that the provisions of the lease did not
restrict erection of the billboard and that the lessor could not unreasonably
withhold its approval of the plans and specifications. The trial court granted
the lessor's motion for summary judgment and the subtenant contended this
was improper on several grounds.229
On appeal, the subtenant first argued that a lessee has an unencumbered
right-to use property for any lawful purpose absent a restriction to the con-
trary, asserting that the lease provision affording to lessor the right to ap-
prove plans dealt only with the sufficiency of the plans and did not extend to
the nature of the use of the property. The court disposed of this contention,
holding that a lessor may put such conditions in a lease with reference to use
and occupancy of the premises as it pleases.230 The subtenant then asserted
that the billboard did not constitute a structure within the meaning of the
lease provision in question. The court found that a billboard constituted a
structure for the purposes of the lease. 23' The subtenant also contended that
the provision allowing the lessor the right to approve plans and specification
was in fatal conflict with another provision of the lease. The court found
that the alleged conflict simply did not exist as the other provision relied
upon by the subtenant dealt with the right to construct improvements fol-
lowing a less than total destruction of existing improvements or destruction
from causes other than fire, hail, or tornado.232 Accordingly, the court af-
firmed the trial court's decision insofar as it provided that the lessor had the
absolute right to refuse permission to erect a billboard on the premises.233
In Ridgeline, Inc. v. Crow-Gottesman-Shafer No. 1234 the court dealt with
the question of whether summary judgment is available if a lessor reasonably
or unreasonably withholds its consent to an assignment or subletting. The
wrong court and that the proceeding properly should have been heard in the bankruptcy court.
Id. (Howell, J., dissenting).
228. 722 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
229. Id. at 526.
230. Id.
231. Id. The court followed decisions in other states that held that billboards are struc-
tures, such as Bossier Center, Inc. v. B&B Systems, Inc., 388 So. 2d 826, 831 (La. Ct. App.
1980). The specific language in the lease required prior approval of plans and specifications for
erection of any "building, structure, or other improvements". The subtenant argued for the
application of the rule of ejusdem generis, stating that since "structure" was a more general
term than "building" and followed it in the provision in question, the general term structure
was limited by the preceding word building. 722 S.W.2d at 527. The court disagreed with this
contention. Id.
232. 722 S.W.2d at 528.
233. Id. at 529.
234. 734 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
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lessor had leased premises for operation of a restaurant pursuant to a written
lease providing that the lessee could not assign or transfer the lease without
the lessor's prior consent, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld.
The lessee then closed its business and undertook to assign the lease to a
restaurant and bar featuring dance music. The lessor refused to consent to
the assignment, and the lessee brought suit alleging damages and a violation
of the Deceptive Trade Practice Act.235 The lessors filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, to which the lessees failed to respond, asserting that the
assignment was to a nightclub.236 After a hearing at which the lessees did
not appear, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the les-
sor.2 3 7 On appeal, the court reversed, finding the summary judgment was
inappropriate on the grounds that the lessor had not filed summary judg-
ment proof addressing the issue of the unreasonable withholding of consent
to an assignment to a restaurant and bar featuring dance music, the lessors'
motion having alleged that the proposed assignment was to a nightclub. 238
More importantly for the real estate practitioner, the court went on to say
that the summary judgment also was not proper because inquiry as to rea-
sonable conduct will almost always be a question of fact precluding sum-
mary judgment. 239 In drafting lease agreements, practitioners will therefore
need to keep in mind that the issue of reasonableness of withholding consent
to a lease assignment or subletting will not be a matter for summary judg-
ment proceedings, except in extraordinary circumstances.
In Inn of the Hills, Ltd. v. Schulgen & Kaiser24° the court dealt with the
question of whether a lessee had given timely notice of its intention to extend
a written lease. The lease agreement afforded to the lessee the right to ex-
tend the lease for successive five year periods, provided notice of extension
was given at least sixty days prior to the expiration of the initial term of the
lease or any extended term then in effect. The original lessee assigned the
lease to a third party, but the assignee, rather amazingly, neither obtained
nor reviewed a copy of the lease prior to the assignment or after. Subse-
quently, the original lessee inquired whether the assignee had exercised its
renewal right. Since the assignee had not done so, he contacted the lessor
and attempted to exercise the right orally. The assignee then mailed a letter
to the lessor exercising the renewal right. The lessor received the letter ap-
proximately two weeks late. When the lessor rejected the lease renewal, the
assignee sued. The trial court allowed the assignee to renew the lease, find-
ing that the failure to timely fulfill the requirement was a result of mere
neglect, that the delay was slight, and that small or no loss to the lessor had
235. Id. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act is found at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.41-.826 (Vernon 1987).
236. 734 S.W.2d at 115.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 116.
239. Id. (citing Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 453-54 (Tex. 1972); Easter
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 535 S.W.2d 700, 702-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no
writ)).
240. 723 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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occurred. 24' The court of civil appeals upheld this decision, noting that
while the assignee was negligent, the evidence was insufficient to establish
gross negligence as a matter of law.242
Santos v. City of Eagle Pass243 dealt with the necessity for a demand for
performance before forfeiture of a lease. A city brought a forcible entry and
detainer suit to recover two separate but adjacent tracts demised by two sep-
arate leases. Since the lessee was delinquent in rental payments on each of
the leases, the city ordered him to vacate the premises. The lessee argued
that a demand for performance was required before the city could lawfully
terminate the lease and his rights to possession. 244 The court disagreed, find-
ing the leases provided by their specific terms for re-entry upon failure to pay
rental.245 The city had complied with the statutory requirements concerning
forcible entry and detainer, which do not require prior demand for perform-
ance unless the written lease agreement or applicable law requires the land-
lord to give such notice.246
B. Damages
In Martinez v. Ball 247 the court dealt with the liability of the assignor of a
leasehold estate for back rent and for removal of fixtures in contravention of
the lease agreement. The assignor had originally entered into the lease and
then assigned its rights to another party. The assignee defaulted in payment
of rent and also vacated the premises after removing some restaurant equip-
ment. The assignors argued that they were no longer liable under the lease
by virtue of their assignment and that no evidence existed to support liability
for damage to the property for removal of fixtures and for the taking of the
fixtures themselves. The court of appeals held that a tenant is not released
from its obligation to pay rent by virtue of the fact that it has assigned the
lease with the lessor's consent. 248 The court also found sufficient evidence to
241. Id. at 300. The trial court followed Jones v. Gibbs, 133 Tex. 627, 640-41, 130 S.W.2d
265, 272 (1939). In that case the Texas Supreme Court stated:
In cases of mere neglect in fulfilling a condition precedent of a lease, which do
not fall within accident or mistake, equity will relieve when the delay has been
slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to grant relief would result in
such hardship to the tenant as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally the
condition precedent of the lease.
133 Tex. at 640-41, 130 S.W.2d at 272. When the lessor characterized the statement as dic-
tum, the court of appeals disagreed and applied it to the case. 723 S.W.2d at 301.
242. 723 S.W.2d at 301.
243. 727 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
244. The lessee relied on the cases of McVea v. Verkins, 587 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Tex. Civ.
App.--Corpus Christi 1979, no writ), and Shepherd v. Sorrells, 182 S.W.2d 1009, 1011 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1944, no writ).
245. 727 S.W.2d at 128.
246. Id. at 128 (referring to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-.011 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
247. 721 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
248. Id. at 581 (citing Shooman v. McAughan, 404 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1966, no writ); Carter v. Stovall, 291 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1956, writ ref'd n.r.e. )). The assignors also argued that a prior eviction of their assignee
constituted a permanent eviction discharging them from liability. The court found that the
eviction was not a permanent deprivation of the right to occupy the premises since the assign-
ees had subsequently brought the rent current and returned to the premises. Id.
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support the award for removal of fixtures and resulting damages. 249
Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container International 250 sets forth the damages
recoverable on an anticipatory breach of a lease by a lessee. Lessor and
lessee entered into a transaction whereby the lessor was to acquire a tract of
land, build a container yard to the lessee's specifications, lease the container
yard to the lessee for a period of ten years, and grant to the lessee the right to
acquire the property. Although the lessee had broad experience in con-
structing container yards and was the entity actually responsible for design
and construction of the facility, the lessee designed and constructed a
container yard that was not adequate for its purposes. After some period of
time, the lessee abandoned the premises and failed to make rental payments.
The lessor undertook to relet the premises, and leased to several tenants who
each, in turn, were unsuccessful in operations.
The federal district court, applying Texas law, found that when a lessor
elects to treat a lessee's abandonment of premises as an anticipatory breach
and thereafter leases the premises for a portion of the original lease term, the
damages recoverable are comprised of two elements: (1) an element of dam-
ages equal to the difference, if any, between the rental reserved under the
original breached lease and rental obtained from the subsequent reletting (if
the subsequent reletting was for a greater rental then no damages would be
recoverable under this component); and (2) as to the portion of the lease
term as to which no reletting was effected, the measure of damages is the
difference between the present value of the rentals reserved in the original
breached lease, reduced by the reasonable cash market value for the leased
premises for the unexpired term.251 In this case, the lessor had failed to
introduce evidence of the fair market cash rental value of the premises for
the unexpired portion of the term, and therefore the court did not allow the
lessor to recover on this particular issue. 25 2
Douglas v. West Alabama, Ltd.2 53 also dealt with the construction of a
damage provision in a written lease. After default under the lease, the lessor
brought suit against the lessee seeking recovery of damages for the time pe-
riod following the tenant's default. The lease provided that the landlord
could recover damages equal to the balance of the rent for the remaining
term less the fair market value of the leased premises for that period. The
trial court awarded damages for the period from the date of default through
the end of the lease based solely on the original rental payable under the
lease, impliedly finding that the premises had no fair market value. 254 The
court of civil appeals reversed, finding that the only testimony introduced at
249. Id. The court quoted Fenlon v. Jaffee, 553 S.W.2d 422, 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), for the proposition that "[a] fixture is broadly defined as something
that is personal in nature but so annexed to realty as to become part of the realty." 721 S.W.2d
at 581.
250. 665 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
251. Id. at 1294 (citing White v. Watkins, 385 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1964, no writ)).
252. Id. at 1295.
253. 722 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
254. Id. at 737.
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trial concerning the fair market rental value of the premises was insufficient
to support the trial court's implied conclusion, and rendered judgment that
the landlord could not collect any damages for the period of time after the
default because of the failure to establish the fair market rental value of the
premises. 255
Inwood North Professional Group-Phase I v. Davidow256 explores the the-
ories of independent covenants in leases and the requisites for proving con-
structive eviction. A lessor had sued a lessee for past due rent and cost of
renovation after the lessee had abandoned the premises and ceased paying
rent. At trial, based on jury findings, the court entered judgment in favor of
the lessee for damages and relocation expenses as a result of lessor's breach
of the lease. 257 The court of civil appeals reversed, noting that the well set-
tled law of Texas is that the lessor's covenant too maintain premises and the
tenant's covenant to pay rent are regarded as independent of one another
unless the lease specifically provides to the contrary. 25 8 Accordingly, the
landlord's failure to repair or maintain did not entitle the tenant to withhold
rent payments.25 9  In this situation the lessee could not use the lessor's
breach of the lease as a defense for nonpayment of the rent. 260 The court of
appeals also held that the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing a
trial amendment raising the defense of constructive eviction, since this issue
had not been tried by consent.26 I The court of appeals therefore reversed the
judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment in favor of the lessor for
lost rents and other costs. 262 In reaching its final determination the court
found that the lessee's pleadings did not raise an affirmative defense of
breach of warranty nor had the lessee provided authority for extending the
warranty of habitability to a commercial lease. 263 In light of the supreme
255. Id. at 737-38. The only testimony at trial was a statement of one of the general part-
ners of the landlord stating that they had been unable to rent the space. The court of civil
appeals indicated that this testimony did not constitute evidence that the property had a fair
market rental value of zero. Testimony to the effect that the space could not be relet at any
price, however, might have been sufficient. Id.
256. 731 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ granted).
257. Id. at 602.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 602-03 (citing Edwards v. Ward Assocs., Inc., 367 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mitchell v. Weiss, 26 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1930, no writ)).
260. Id. at 603.
261. Id. at 603-04.
262. Id. The court also stated that the elements required for proving constructive eviction
are as follows:
(1) [A]n intention on the part of the landlord that the tenant shall no longer
enjoy the premises, which intention may be inferred from the circumstances
proven; (2) a material act by the landlord or those acting for him that substan-
tially interferes with the use and enjoyment of the premises for the purposes for
which they are let; (3) the act must permanently deprive the tenant of the use
and enjoyment of the premises; and (4) the tenant must abandon the premises
within a reasonable time after the commission of the act.
Id. at 603 (citing Charalambous v. Jean Lafitte Corp., 652 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
263. Id. In Kammarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. 1978), the Texas
Supreme Court first established the implied warranty of habitability for residential property.
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court's having granted writ in this case, and its other recent holdings in the
general area of implied warranties, we may see just such an extension of the
habitability warranty.
C. Duties to Occupants and Visitors
Prestwood v. Taylor 264 provides an analysis of the duty owed by a posses-
sor of property to a business visitor or invitee. A lessee had filed for bank-
ruptcy and, in the bankruptcy proceeding, a trustee was appointed. The
trustee, while visiting the leased premises, stepped onto a freight elevator
that collapsed, causing injury to the trustee. The trustee then sued both the
lessee and the owner of the premises under negligence theories. The trial
court held that the trustee was a business invitee based on the findings that
the owner was an occupier of the premises in question, that the owner
should have known of the dangerous condition, that the owner had failed to
exercise reasonable care to warn of or eliminate the risk, that the trustee was
on the premises in an official capacity, and that the trustee's presence on the
premises was of mutual benefit to both the trustee and the owner.265
The court of civil appeals, in a carefully reasoned decision, examined
many authorities and found insufficient evidence to support the holding that
the owner had breached any duty owed to the trustee. 266 The court noted
that, in order to sustain the trial court's judgment, it must first find that the
trustee was a business visitor of the owner and that the owner was a party
entitled to possess the premises. Such a finding would then lead to a duty on
the part of the owner to inspect the premises, discover dangerous conditions,
and then either to repair those conditions or provide a warning. 267 The
court first traced the history dealing with the duty owed to visitors who
enter leased premises for business purposes when the premises are not gener-
ally held out for access to the public, and noted that under applicable Texas
law the requirements for recovery are that the possessor's activities amount
to an invitation to the injured party to enter the premises, and that a direct
pecuniary benefit be expected to flow from such visit. 268 The court then
turned to the question of whether the owner's status rose to that of a posses-
sor of the premises and determined that the owner did not rise to such level
since the trustee asserted that he was entitled to control of the premises by
virtue of his status.269 Even though the trustee gave the owner keys to the
premises to enable the owner to show the premises to other parties, the court
held that evidence was insufficient to prove the owner's possession of the
264. 728 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
265. Id. at 457.
266. Id. at 465.
267. Id. at 457-58.
268. Id. at 458-59 (citing Olivier v. Snowden, 426 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Tex. 1968)). The court
noted that a majority of jurisdictions in applying the business visitor theory require the same
standard as to invitation as Texas, but require only business dealings, rather than a direct
pecuniary benefit. 728 S.W.2d at 458-59 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332(3)
(1965)).




As an alternative basis for its decision, the court examined whether or not
the trustee was a business invitee. The court found the evidence insufficient
to support a holding that the trustee was a business invitee. 271 The court
noted that in order to impart to a visitor the status of an invitee, words or
conduct of the possessor must lead or encourage the visitor to believe that its
entry on the premises is in some way desired by the possessor. 272 The evi-
dence in the case indicated that the owner had never requested entry on the
premises by the trustee, and indeed, supported the conclusion that the
trustee was entering the premises in exercise of his duty as a bankruptcy
trustee. 273 Since the trustee was a licensee and the owner did not owe him a
duty of inspection, the court held that the trustee could not recover damages
from the owner.274
Ceiling Fan Warehouse, Inc. No. 3 v. Morgan 275 also dealt with the duty
owed by an occupier of premises to an invitee. A customer was injured
when a display maintained in a retail store fell on him. In affirming the trial
court's judgment for liability of the store, the court held that the standard of
care owed by an occupier towards invitees is the ordinary care that a reason-
ably prudent person would exercise under the circumstances. 276 The court
also considered relevant the question of whether the occupier had acted in
accordance with what he knew or should have known about the risks to
invitees. 277
In Hendricks v. Todora 278 the court of civil appeals rejected the claims of
restaurant patrons who suffered damages when a drunken driver crashed
through the glass brick wall of the waiting area for the restaurant.279 In
addition to suing the driver of the car, the injured patrons also sued the
owner and lessor of the property, the lessee of the property, and a related
company. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the owner,
lessee, and related company finding that, as a matter of law, the conduct of
the third party driver was unforeseeable and that the defendants owed no
duty to protect the patrons.280 The court relied on the facts that the action
by the third party was criminal in nature and that no prior history of this
type of activity existed so as to put the owner and the lessee on notice of the
potential of this type of harm.28 '
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 462-63.
273. 728 S.W.2d at 463.
274. Id. at 464-65.
275. 723 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, modified and aff'd, 725
S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. 1987)).
276. Id. at 197 (citing Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1983)).
277. Id.
278. 722 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
279. Id at 465.
280. Id. at 459-60.




House Bill 2481282 amended section 91.002 of the Property Code dealing
with interruption of utilities furnished to a tenant and the exclusion of a
tenant, adding specific provisions dealing with commercial tenancies. Under
the revision, a commercial tenant is deemed to have abandoned leased prem-
ises if goods, property, or other material are removed in an amount sufficient
to indicate a probable intent to abandon.283 The act also specifically pro-
vides that a landlord may remove and store a commercial tenant's prop-
erty.284 The act further provides that if a landlord changes the lock of a
commercial tenant who is delinquent in rent, the landlord must place a no-
tice on the tenant's front door stating the name and the address or telephone
number of the party from whom a new key can be obtained. 28 5 A residential
lease may not contain a provision waiving a right or exempting a party from
a liability or duty under section 91.002, but a commercial lease may
supercede the section to the extent of any conflict. 286 Unfortunately, at the
same time the legislature amended section 91.002 in the manner provided in
House Bill 2481, it also passed Senate Bill No. 1037,287 which renumbered
section 91.002 of the Texas Property Code as section 92.008 and moved it to
chapter 92, which deals only with residential tenancies. Although it is not
clear how this disparity will ultimately be dealt with, the distinction is worth
noting. At the time of the codification effected by the Texas Property Code,
the provisions of old article 5236c dealing with interruption of utilities to,
and exclusions of, residential tenants were placed in chapter 91 of the Prop-
erty Code, which is applicable to landlords and tenants generally, when they
properly should have been placed in chapter 92. Under the two bills passed
by this legislature, rather incongruously, section 91.002 has been moved to
chapter 92 thereby limiting its effect to residential tenancies only, but under
the amendment effected by House Bill No. 2481, the statute will have provi-
sions dealing specifically with commercial tenancies.
VIII. MORTGAGES
A. Mortgages Generally
Allied Bank v. Plaza deVille Associates288 dealt with the obligations of a
construction lender to properly administer its construction loan. The own-
ers of two apartment projects and certain mechanic's and materialmen's lien
claimants brought suit against a construction lender alleging they were enti-
tled to damages and subordination of liens arising out of the lender's admin-
282. Act of June 19, 1987, ch. 826, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5733 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 91.002 (Vernon Supp. 1988)). See infra note 287.




287. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 683, § 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5078 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.008 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
288. 733 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
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istration of the construction loans for the apartment projects. The
construction lender had entered into loan agreements with a developer who,
concurrently with the extension of the construction loans, had sold the
projects to two syndicated limited partnerships, the developer being obli-
gated to complete construction of the projects, to pay cash flow from the
projects, and to perform certain other acts. The developer apparently com-
pleted the first project satisfactorily but defaulted on the second project.
When the construction lender posted for foreclosure, the owners and lien
claimants sued the lender. After a jury trial, the trial court rather astonish-
ingly entered judgment against the construction lender for actual and exem-
plary damages based on causes of action for fraud and negligence and
ordered an equitable subordination of the construction lender's liens to those
of the mechanic's lien claimants. 289
The court of civil appeals first addressed the question of whether the con-
struction lender had any liability to the apartment purchasers or to the
mechanic's lien claimants under the relevant construction loan documenta-
tion. The court first stated that its duty was to construe written documents
in accordance with their terms and not to resort to extrinsic evidence unless
there are ambiguities inherent in the documents. 290 The court noted that the
loan documents were between the construction lender and the developer,
and that, although the construction loan agreements set out detailed require-
ments specifying the prerequisites to disbursements of funds as is typical,
each document also provided that the construction lender could waive these
provisions and also expressly provided that the conditions to advancing
funds were for the sole benefit of the lender and were not to benefit any third
person.291 In light of these specific rights and disclaimers of liability, the
court found that the apartment owners might have a claim against the lender
only if the lender was a surety to the developer's obligations. 292 The court
noted that a specific agreement entered into between the construction lender
and the owners negated any obligation on the part of the owners for liability
in respect of the construction loans. 293 Accordingly, the court found that
the construction lender could not be liable for fraud to the owners since the
owners had no right to rely on the construction loan agreements, that the
lender had no liability for breach of contract since the lender had complied
with the specific provisions of the loan agreement, and finally that the con-
struction lender was not negligent because the lender owed no duty to the
apartment owners for distribution of loan proceeds. 294
The court next turned to that portion of the trial court's judgment subor-
dinating the construction lender's liens to those of the mechanic's lien claim-
289. Id. at 568.
290. Id. at 569 (citing Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)).
291. Id. at 570. Evidently the construction lender disbursed all of the loans proceeds with-
out retaining 10% and without requiring evidence that all materials and labor for construction
had been paid for. Id.





ants on a theory of equitable subordination. The court reversed the trial
court's judgment, finding no inequitable conduct on the part of the construc-
tion lender, since the lender fulfilled its obligations in accordance with its
loan documentation. 295
The court next turned to the construction lender's claim for rentals re-
ceived by the apartment owners following default on the construction loan.
The court found that the lender was entitled to recover these amounts in
light of its prior lien on rents and specific language in the agreement between
the apartment owners and the lender recognizing that the owners' rights
were subordinate to those of the construction lender.296 Accordingly, the
court entered judgment in favor of the construction lender as against the
claims of the apartment owners and mechanic's lien claimants and in favor
of the lender for recovery of the rentals. 297
The court reviewed the enforceability of a deed of trust that had been
notarized by the trustee named in the deed of trust in Denson v. First Bank &
Trust.298 The mortgagors sought to enjoin a foreclosure sale, alleging that
the deed of trust was void or voidable because the trustee named in the deed
of trust had taken the acknowledgment on the deed of trust. The court re-
jected this argument, stating that the purpose of the acknowledgment is for
recording, that is, to impart notice to third parties, and that neither ac-
knowledgment nor recordation is required to make a valid, binding obliga-
tion or conveyance between the parties to the instrument. 299
Swiss Avenue Bank v. Slivka 30° dealt with the recovery of attorney's fees
under provisions contained in promissory notes secured by deeds of trust.
The debtor had defaulted under two notes and deeds of trust. In an earlier
suit, after the bank had accelerated maturity of the notes and posted for
foreclosure, the borrower sued to enjoin the foreclosure sales. In that pro-
ceeding, the bank answered and sought attorney's fees. The court denied
both the injunctive relief sought by the debtor and the bank's claim for attor-
ney's fees since the bank was not suing to collect the notes, but was rather
defending the injunctive action. 30 1 Immediately following the judgment de-
nying injunctive relief, the bank again reposted for foreclosure, sending a
295. Id.
296. Id. at 572-73.
297. Id. at 573.
298. 728 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
299. Id. at 877 (citing Drake v. McGalin, 626 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1981, no writ); Steed v. Crossland, 252 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1952,
writ ref'd); and Shaw v. Jackson, 227 S.W. 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1920, no
writ)).
300. 724 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
301. Slivka v. Swiss Ave. Bank, 653 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
The provisions of the notes in question read as follows:
In the event default is made in the prompt payment of this note when due or
declared due, and the same is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection,
or suit is brought on same, or the same is collected through any judicial proceed-
ings whatever, then the makers hereof agree and promise to pay ten per centum
(10%) additional on the amount of the principal and interest then owing as
attorneys' fees.
724 S.W.2d at 395.
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demand letter to the debtor that claimed ten percent of the outstanding prin-
cipal and interest as attorney's fees. At trial, the court held that the amount
claimed for attorney's fees was unreasonable since the only service rendered
by the bank's attorneys subsequent to the first suit was, evidently, drafting
the new demand letter.30 2 The bank asserted that the fees sought were rea-
sonable for defending the prior injunctive suit and that it was entitled to
recovery the fees under the terms of the notes. The court of civil appeals
held in favor the bank, first finding that the doctrine of res judicata poten-
tially arising from the first case did not bar the bank's action,303 end then
finding that the bank could recover under the contractual provisions of the
notes as a part of the bank's overall collection efforts. 3
°4
In Glen Ridge I Condominiums Ltd. v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corp.305 the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) had
acted as a receiver of a federally insured savings and loan association. A
mortgagor of that savings and loan attempted to enjoin FSLIC from fore-
closing certain deeds of trust liens on condominium projects. At trial the
court dismissed the mortgagor's suit seeking to enjoin foreclosure asserting
that the mortgagor lacked jurisdiction over FSLIC in its capacity as re-
ceiver. 306 After a lengthy analysis, the court of civil appeals reversed the
trial court's decision and remanded for trial the state law causes of action
raised by the mortgagors. 30 7 Although the discussion on constitutional is-
sues is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note that the court
held that FSLIC, when it is serving as a receiver and is attempting to enforce
rights of the predecessor association, may be subject to local judicial deter-
mination of a borrower's defenses in the same manner as other lenders.
FSLIC argued that any claims of the mortgagors, such as usury or other
irregularities in administration or granting of loans had to be dealt with in
administrative proceedings while it, under its powers to liquidate failed as-
sociations, could proceed to collect assets (i.e., foreclose on the deed of trust
liens) and liquidate the collateral for the benefit of depositors. Attorneys
dealing with federally insured lenders are referred to this case for its reason-
ing, since this area is sure to develop more fully over the coming year.
308
B. Usury
El Paso Development Co. v. Berryman 309 dealt with the propriety of en-
302. 724 S.W.2d at 395-96.
303. Id. at 396.
304. Id. at 397-98 (citing RepublicBank Dallas v. Shook, 653 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tex.
1983)).
305. 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
306. Id. at 376. The trial court relied upon 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (West 1980). 734
S.W.2d at 376.
307. 734 S.W.2d at 387.
308. See also D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1942) (since FDIC is
a federal corporation, it may sue in federal district court to collect debts). But see North Miss.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1103 (5th Cir. 1985) (mortgagor must chal-
lenge FSLIC's action before the Federal Home Loan Bank Board prior to seeking judicial
review), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
309. 729 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
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joining a foreclosure sale in the face of a claim of usury. The mortgagor had
contracted to acquire certain property from the mortgagee on a cash basis
but was unable to fulfill that contract. A few months later the parties en-
tered into a new contract that provided for a credit sale at a higher purchase
price with eight percent interest per annum accruing on the new note. Sub-
sequently, the mortgagor filed suit for usury, alleging that the increase in
purchase price for the credit sale as compared to the cash sale constituted
interest, that the total amount of interest charged in connection with the
transaction was usurious, and that both principal and interest should be for-
feited because the amount of interest charged was double the amount al-
lowed by law. The mortgagee then sought to foreclose its liens, but the trial
court enjoined him from doing so. On appeal the mortgagee argued that the
mortgagor was not entitled to equitable relief because the mortgagor had not
done equity because it had not tendered payment of the debt. The court of
civil appeals rejected this argument, noting that the cases relied upon by the
mortgagor were cases in which the parties did not dispute the legality of the
debt in question.310 The court then reviewed the law pertaining to time
price differentials and, while noting that a true time price differential is not
interest and is therefore not subject to the usury laws, nonetheless found that
the mortgagor had established a sufficient probability of recovery to support
the trial court's discretionary granting of injunctive relief.311 The court also
found that, although the mortgagor had a remedy at law for damages, such a
remedy would be inadequate given the uniqueness of every tract of real es-
tate.312 Finally, the court found that an injunction bond in the amount of
$15,000 was sufficient even though the outstanding balance of the note was
in excess of $7,000,000 since the mortgaged property was worth more than
the amount of the debt and the trial court had not enjoined the accrual of
interest on the note. 313
The harsh results that can arise from a charge of usurious interest are
clearly illustrated in Danziger v. San Jacinto Savings Association.314 The bor-
rowers entered into a contract for a home improvement loan providing for
add on interest as permitted by statute.315 The contract provided that the
entire principal amount of the loan would be advanced and placed in escrow,
and then funds would be disbursed to the contractor doing the home im-
provement work as the work progressed. The lender charged interest on the
entire principal amount of the loan from the time of advance. At the end of
the disbursement period, the lender calculated how much money had been
held in the escrow account during each payment period and credited the
borrowers for interest charged on the funds held in escrow prior to the time
that the funds had been disbursed to the contractor.
310. Id. at 885.
311. Id. at 886-87.
312. Id. at 888 (citing Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 688
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.
313. Id. at 888-89.
314. 732 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1987).
315. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-5.02 (Vernon 1987).
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The Texas Supreme Court first addressed the practice of charging interest
on the entire amount advanced and then providing a subsequent credit. The
court expressly held that this practice constituted an unlawful charge of usu-
rious interest, which could not be cured by the, subsequent crediting proce-
dure.316 The supreme court next addressed the assertion of the borrowers
that if the court found that the lenders had charged usurious interest, then
the court must necessarily find that the lender had charged double the lawful
rate, since the lender made no disbursements to the contractor until some
time after the initial advance of funds into the escrow account, the effect
then being that the lender charged interest on a loan whose outstanding
principal balance was zero.317 The court rejected this argument stating that
calculating the amount of interest charged requires looking to the full term
of the note and spreading the interest charged over the entire term to deter-
mine the extent of the usurious overcharge. 318 Applying this formula, the
court found that the interest charged did not exceed twice the legal rate of
interest.319
The court next addressed whether a verbal statement of the amount re-
quired to pay the loan in full constituted a charge of interest for the purpose
of the usury statutes. After reviewing a variety of authorities concerning the
matter, the court held that a payoff quote that reflects an interest charge in
excess of that allowed by the statutes, constitutes a charge of interest. 320
The court held that the lender had charged double usurious interest when it
made the payoff quote to the borrower, even though the borrower had no
intention of paying off the loan early. 321 In reaching this holding the court
specifically reserved the issue of whether a lender may accrue interest on an
escrow account in a usury context. 322
In addition to the statutory causes of action, the borrowers also asserted a
common law claim for return of all interest paid and cancellation of future
interest. The court held that the borrowers had properly pleaded the com-
mon law claim, had preserved it on appeal, and were therefore entitled to
recover interest paid. 323 Finally, the court addressed the question of
whether the lender's disclosures violated the Federal Truth-in-Lending
316. 732 S.W.2d at 302. The court noted that the legislature had provided for a credit of
interest only in the case of a prepayment. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(a)
(Vernon 1987).
317. 732 S.W.2d at 303.
318. Id. (citing Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tex. 1977)). The
relevant statute setting forth the penalty for charging double the amount of lawful interest is
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01 (Vernon 1987).
319. 732 S.W.2d at 303.
320. Id. at 304 (citing Wright Way Spraying Serv. v. Butler, 690 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Tex.
1985) (monthly statements may constitute charge of interest); Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe &
Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1977) (entry on statement of account); Dryden v. City Nat'l
Bank, 666 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (demand letters);
Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (affidavits and pleadings)).
321. Id. at 303-04.




Act,3 2 4 found that the lender's oral disclosures did not substantially comply
with the act's requirements, noted that even a technical violation of this act
imposes liability, and held that the borrowers could recover an additional
penalty thereunder. 325
Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the judgments of the lower
courts and rendered judgment in favor of the borrowers for recovery of
double the amount of interest contracted for, recovery of all interest paid
under the common law theory, and the statutory penalty provided for under
the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act. 32 6 Justice Gonzales, in a concurring
opinion, agreed with the court but characterized as dictum that part of the
majority opinion indicating that statements in pleadings can constitute a
charge of interest, stating that, in his view, the court had not yet directly
addressed that issue.327 This case can be put in perspective by noting that,
although the lender overcharged the buyer only $1,172.62 in interest, this
overcharge entitled the borrowers to recover double the amount of interest
contracted for, an amount of $94,434.80, plus all interest actually paid and a
$2,000 penalty under the applicable federal law, as well as reasonable attor-
neys' fees.328 The court remanded the case to allocate the payments between
principal and interest and to determine reasonable attorneys' fees. 329
In Coppedge v. Colonial Savings & Loan Association 330 a Texas court also
dealt with the charging of usurious interest, this time in connection with a
home loan secured by a deed of trust. The owners had contracted to sell
their house and in closing the transaction prepaid an outstanding loan. The
lender, however, notified the title company handling the transaction to with-
hold an additional sum of money, apparently based upon a claim of violation
of the due on sale provisions in the deed of trust; the amount claimed was
held in escrow by the title company. Subsequently, an attorney for the
324. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982).
325. 732 S.W.2d at 304-05. The Truth-in-Lending Act requires that the lender give the
borrower clear and conspicuous information in every consumer credit transaction. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1631 (1982). The annual percentage rate and the finance charge must "be disclosed more
conspicuously than other terms." Id. § 1632. The creditor must disclose the following
information:
(1) the amount financed,
(2) the total finance charge in dollars,
(3) the annual percentage rate,
(4) the number and dates of payment,
(5) the total sales price, which includes the total finance charge,
(6) definitions of terms used, such as annual percentage rate,
(7) statement on any security interest,
(8) any late payment charge,
(9) any consumer rebate of finance charge applicable,(10) statement that consumer should read the terms of the document attached,
(11) "in any residential mortgage transaction, a statement indicating whether
a subsequent purchaser or assignee ... may assume the debt obligation."
Id. § 1638.
326. 732 S.W.2d at 305.
327. Id. (Gonzales, J., concurring).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. 721 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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lender sent the owner a letter demanding payment of the amount in ques-
tion, characterizing it as back interest, and demanding attorney's fees. The
title company then delivered the funds to the lender based on its claim. Ap-
proximately eight months later the lenders returned the amount in question,
with interest, to the owners. The owners then sued the lenders for usury.
The court first dealt with the issue of whether the amount in question
constituted interest, since the loan had been paid in full. The court found
that since the lender claimed the sum in question as additional compensation
for the use of money the amount constituted interest, and that the payment
in full of the loan did not change the nature of the sum as compensation for
the use of money. 33' The court also found that the lender had both charged
and received the usurious interest, the charge occurring when the demand
letter was sent and the receipt having occurred when the amount was col-
lected from the title company. 332 The lender then raised the statutory provi-
sions dealing with the spreading of interest and refunding of payments as a
defense to the usury penalties. 333 The court, however, found that the lender
had charged the borrower excess interest and that the lender was not entitled
to the benefits of the refund provisions of the statute.334 The court held that
the refund provision was intended to allow lenders to avoid usury penalties
when they have inadvertently received usurious interest by virtue of a pre-
payment by a borrower, and that the provision was not available to a lender
who had, by its own actions, demanded, charged, and received usurious in-
terest. 335 The court therefore assessed the statutory penalties for usury
against the lender.3 36
Benser v. Independence Bank 337 dealt with whether a junior lienholder
may seek to have a prior lien declared void for usury. The holders of a note
secured by a junior lien on real property brought suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that a senior note and deed of trust were void because of usury.
The junior lienholder alleged that a sum of money that a prior owner had
paid for the renewal and extension of the senior lien indebtedness constituted
interest such that the aggregate interest charged was in excess of the lawful
rate. The senior lienholders alleged that the sum was paid as consideration
331. Id. at 936.
332. Id.
333. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(a) (Vernon 1987), which provides, in part:
[T]he lender contracting for, charging, or receiving all such interest shall refund
to the borrower the amount of the excess or shall credit the amount of the excess
against amounts owing under the loan and shall not be subject to any of the
penalties provided by law for contracting for, charging, or receiving interest in
excess of the maximum lawful rate.
334. 721 S.W.2d at 938. The refund provision applies only when the buyer pays off the
loan early and is entitled to a refund of interest. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(a)
(Vernon 1987).
335. 721 S.W.2d at 938.
336. Id. The court also dealt with the question of whether or not the homeowners had a
common law usury claim. The court found that the common law claim did exist, but did not
entitle the homeowners to any relief beyond that to which they were entitled under the statu-
tory provisions. This holding should be compared with the Texas Supreme Court's holding in
Danziger, 732 S.W.2d at 304.
337. 735 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
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for termination of foreclosure proceedings and did not constitute interest.
The majority of the court of civil appeals assumed for purposes of the opin-
ion that the sum of money paid was interest and that a usurious transaction
had occurred, and proceeded to determine the relative rights of the parties in
light of the assumption.33 8
The court analyzed the relevant statutes and case law and held that a
claim of usury is personal to the debtor or obligor and that a junior
lienholder, not being obligated to pay the indebtedness in question, has no
standing to assert the usury claim. 33 9 The court distinguished the cases re-
lied upon by the junior lienholders, noting that those cases had been decided
under a previous codification of the usury statutes that declared usurious
contracts void, while the current statutory provisions dealing with the penal-
ties for usury clearly state that the penalties are payable only to the obli-
gor. 340 The court stated that even though under current Texas law a
usurious contract is void, a junior lienholder nonetheless has no standing to
raise the usurious nature of a note secured by a prior lien.
34 1
One justice concurred in the result but expressly disagreed with the
court's reasoning.3 42  Justice LaGarde would have held that a junior
lienholder has a sufficient justiciable interest and standing to raise the ques-
tion of whether indebtedness secured by a prior lien would be void for usury,
since this would in turn render the lien void and, thus directly affect the
junior lienholder's rights. 4 3 The justice concurred with the reasoning that
the monetary penalties provided for by the usury statutes would not be col-
lectible by a junior lienholder in light of their specific language, but did not
find this dispositive of the issue of whether a junior lienholder has standing
to assert that a prior lien is void because of usury.344
C. Foreclosure and Injunction
In Jasper Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Reddel1345 the supreme
court dealt with the duty to comply with specific contractual notice provi-
sions contained in a deed of trust prior to foreclosure. After default in pay-
ment of their loan, the mortgagors received a notice from counsel for the
338. Id. at 568.
339. Id. (citing Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1979);
Micrea, Inc. v. Eureka Life Ins. Co. of America, 534 S.W.2d 348, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987)).
340. Id. at 568-69. The junior lienholders relied upon Maloney v. Eaheart, 81 Tex. 281,
284, 16 S.W. 1030, 1031 (1891), and Johnson v. Lasker Real Estate Ass'n, 21 S.W. 961, 962
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1893). The current usury penalty statute relied upon by the court
is TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1987).
341. 735 S.W.2d at 569.
342. Id. at 570-71 (LaGarde, J., concurring).
343. Id. at 572-73.
344. Id. at 574. Justice LaGarde concurred in the result because he characterized the pay-
ment made in connection with the renewal and extension of the prior lien indebtedness as
having been made under an agreement separate from the original note and deed of trust. Even
if the separate renewal agreement were void for usury, therefore, the previously existing note
and deed of trust would not be void. Id.
345. 730 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1987).
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lender indicating that their loan was past due, that they could avoid foreclo-
sure proceedings by paying the delinquency and accrued costs, and that, if
the delinquency was not cured, the lender would foreclose. The specific con-
tractual provisions of the deed of trust, however, also required that the
lender give the mortgagors notice of their right to reinstate after acceleration
and of the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a de-
fault or to raise any other defense the mortgagors might have. The notice
the lender gave to the mortgagors did not inform them of their reinstatement
right or of their right to assert legal defenses. The mortgagors did not cure
the default, their indebtedness was accelerated, and the property was posted
for foreclosure. The notices given in connection with the acceleration and
posting complied with the relevant statutory provisions. After the foreclo-
sure sale, the mortgagor brought suit for wrongful foreclosure, relying upon
the deficiencies in the original notice.
The trial court held that the mortgagors were estopped from complaining
of the deficiencies in the original notice because they had actual notice of
their reinstatement rights and their right to assert defenses by virtue of hav-
ing consulted with counsel.346 The court of appeals reversed, holding that
strict compliance with the terms of the deed of trust was required.347 The
supreme court, reversing the court of appeals and upholding the trial court,
held that, although strict compliance with legal notice requirements is re-
quired in order to conduct a foreclosure sale, the provisions of the deed of
trust providing for additional notice constituted a contractual obligation be-
tween the mortgagor and mortgagee, and actual notice of the rights in ques-
tion sufficiently complied with Texas law respecting notice prior to
acceleration of maturity and foreclosure of liens.348
Intertex, Inc. v. Cowden 349 presented interesting questions about proper
procedures in conducting a foreclosure sale. The trustee under a deed of
trust had posted for foreclosure and was instructed to sell the property in
question at a public, nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Because of a pending in-
surance claim, however, the trustee became concerned about the proper
amount to bid at the foreclosure on behalf of the mortgagee. If the insurance
claim was not properly accounted for, the trustee would perhaps be auction-
ing the property for less than the total debt and would not be selling the
property for the highest offer. The trustee attempted to contact the mortga-
gee to discuss this issue on the day of foreclosure but was unsuccessful, and
at sale ultimately bid in an amount in excess of that authorized by the mort-
346. Id. at 674.
347. Reddell v. Jasper Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 722 S.W.2d 551, 553-54 (rex. App.-
Beaumont), rev'd, 730 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1987). The court of appeals felt bound by the hold-
ings in Houston First Am. Say. v. Musik, 650 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. 1983) (trustee must
comply with notice provision in deed of trust) and Ogden v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d
232, 234 (Tex. 1982) (mortgagee failed to give adequate notice to mortgagor under the deed of
trust). The supreme court found that these cases, which delineate the requirements for notice
prior to acceleration of maturity and posting for foreclosure, were not applicable to the con-
tractual notice in issue in this case. 730 S.W.2d at 674.
348. 730 S.W.2d at 675.
349. 728 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, no writ).
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gagee. On the next day the mortgagee refused to ratify the unauthorized bid
and the property was subsequently reposted for sale in the following month.
The party offering the second highest bid at the initial sale, however, upon
finding that the mortgagee's bid had not been ratified, brought suit for de-
claratory judgment that it was entitled to the property by virtue of the bid
made at the first foreclosure sale.
The second highest bidder's first argument was that the mortgagee could
not be the highest bidder because the bid was unauthorized and because the
mortgagee failed to credit the bid against its note within a reasonable period
of time. The court rejected this argument, pointing out that the mortgagee
could have ratified the bid and stating that the reasonable time limitation
imposed on cash bidders at foreclosure sales did not appear to be applicable
to mortgagees bidding for credit against their own notes.350 The second
highest bidder also argued that the trustee was required to sell the property
to him rather than reposting the property for sale, but the court rejected this
argument as well since the mortgagee's disaffirmance of the trustee's bid was
not discovered until the next day and therefore reconvening the sale would
have been impossible; reposting the property was the proper procedure. 35'
Finally, the second highest bidder argued that a foreclosure sale is similar to
an auction transaction and that, under the rules applicable to auctions, a bid
for cash is an offer and a contract is created upon the making of the highest
bid. The court also rejected this argument, finding that the appellant was
not the highest bidder for cash and that no contract had ever been cre-
ated.3 52 Accordingly, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision
in favor of the mortgagee. 353
Lamar Savings Association v. White 354 illustrates some of the procedural
machinations that some debtors will undertake in these times to avoid a fore-
closure. A lender filed suit in Travis County, Texas, alleging default in pay-
ment of certain promissory notes, and thereafter posted the properties
securing payment of the notes for foreclosure. One of the debtors involved
then filed suit in Harris County, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduci-
ary duty, usury, and other defenses arising out of an alleged failure to extend
maturity of one of the promissory notes that was the subject of the Travis
County suit. The lender then filed a plea in abatement as to the Harris
350. Id. at 816 (citing Habitat, Inc. v. McKanna, 523 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1974, no writ)).
351. Id. at 816-17 (citing Mitchell v. Texas Commerce Bank, 680 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (a reconvened foreclosure sale held after the original
high bidder was unable to obtain necessary funds was invalid because bidders had dispersed;
sale required reposting); Kirkman v. Amarillo Say. Ass'n, 483 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding a reconvened foreclosure sale when all the
bidders had regathered after the original high bidder was unable to meet his offer price);
Clearman v. Graham, 4 S.W.2d 581, 582-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1928, writ dism'd) (find-
ing that a second sale was invalid when the original high bidder was unable to meet his cash
bid and the bidders at the first sale had dispersed; accordingly, the property should have been
readvertised for bid)).
352. Id. at 818.
353. Id. at 820.
354. 731 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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County action, alleging that dominant jurisdiction in the case resided with
the Travis County court. The Harris County court denied the plea and is-
sued a temporary injunction prohibiting the lender from taking steps to fore-
close its liens and from taking further action in any other court in respect of
the indebtedness. 3 5
The court of civil appeals first noted that the court in which a suit is first
filed acquires dominant jurisdiction over that case and its subject matter. 356
The court then addressed the allegation of the debtor that it had not been
served with citation and, from the record, found that the lender had dili-
gently tried to obtain service of process and was stopped from doing so by
the injunctive relief issued in Harris County. 357 Having found that the
lender had sought to prosecute the suit in Travis County in good faith, the
court then turned to the allegations of the borrower that the subject matter
of the Harris County suit was separate and distinct from the proceedings
brought in Travis County. The court had little difficulty finding that the
debtor's claims arose out of a note that was the subject matter of the suit
brought in Travis County and also disagreed with the debtor's argument
that seeking restraint of foreclosure proceedings was a basis for a separate
action. 358 The court therefore held that the Travis County court had
jurisdiction.359
Anderson Oaks v. Anderson Mill Oaks36° dealt with the necessary showing
required to support the granting of a temporary injunction prohibiting a
foreclosure sale. The purchaser of two apartment projects, after acquisition,
discovered construction defects and requested the prior owners to remedy
the same. The prior owners undertook to do so, but a dispute arose as to
whether the prior owners had properly done the repair work. When the
purchaser failed to make payments on a purchase money indebtedness se-
cured by deed of trust encumbering the projects, the prior owners posted
their liens for foreclosure. The purchaser then filed suit, alleging breach of
contract and other matters. The purchaser also sought injunctive relief
prohibiting foreclosure of the liens, which the trial court denied.36'
The court of civil appeals reversed, finding that the trial court had abused
its discretion in denying injunctive relief.362 In so holding, the court first
noted that the granting of injunctive relief requires a showing of probable
irreparable injury and a probable right of recovery on the merits. 363 Since
the record on appeal did not contain a statement of facts or conclusions of
law on the injunction issue, the court assumed that the trial court had found
355. Id. at 716.
356. Id. (citing Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974)).
357. Id. at 717.
358. Id. at 717-18.
359. Id.
360. 734 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
361. Id. at 43.
362. Id. at 43-44.




adversely to the purchaser on both issues.364 The court first noted that in a
case in which a foreclosure sale would deprive the party seeking injunctive
relief of possession and use of the property, as a foreclosure sale always will,
the party's legal remedy is inadequate as a matter of law.365 The court then
reviewed at length the allegations concerning construction defects, and in
light of the rather scanty record, and balancing the equities, found the trial
court had abused its discretion by failing to enjoin the foreclosure, since the
purchaser would lose its property interest, while the prior owners would
only experience delay in foreclosing their liens. 366 Accordingly, the court
reversed the order of the trial court and remanded the case for issuance of a
temporary injunction after fixing the amount of the injunction bond.367
The court addressed the propriety of temporarily enjoining a foreclosure
sale in Guardian Savings & Loan Association v. Williams,368 which contains
interesting language for the real estate lawyer as to the showing of irrepara-
ble injury required in these cases. A real estate developer sought to enjoin a
foreclosure sale, alleging usury.369 Interestingly, the appellate court upheld
the trial court's determination that the developer would not be compensable
in money for damages suffered if foreclosure occurred. 370 The developer al-
leged that the sale would deprive him of the ability to develop the property
and thereby achieve its full benefit. At trial the developer testified that a
foreclosure would be injurious to his reputation and would impair his ability
to borrow money from other financial institutions. The court of civil ap-
peals, finding this evidence sufficient to support the injunctive relief, noted
that every piece of real estate is unique, that this particular property was
strategically located for development purposes, and that the developer did in
fact plan to develop the property.37' It is instructive to compare the sort of
analysis as to irreparable injury set forth in this case with the rather perfunc-
tory statement in Anderson Oaks.372
Texas American Bank/West Side v. Haven373 dealt with the power of a
receiver appointed in a divorce proceeding to enjoin a foreclosure sale. A
receiver had been appointed in a divorce proceeding and was empowered to
sell the parties' house. Some time after the divorce was granted, the bank
holding a mortgage secured by the house commenced foreclosure proceed-
364. Id.
365. Id. at 43-44 (citing Sumner v. Crawford, 91 Tex. 129, 132, 41 S.W. 994, 996 (1897)).
366. Id. at 45.
367. Id. at 46.
368. 731 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
369. Apparently the transaction involved the situation in which the developer and the
lender were also joint venture partners, with the lender loaning money to the joint venture in
question.
370. 731 S.W.2d at 109.
371. Id. The court distinguished its previous holding in Ginther-Davis v. Houston Nat'l
Bank, 600 S.W.2d 856, 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), be-
cause, in that case, the party seeking the injunction alleged that the real estate was unique, but
did not specify why. Furthermore, their objective was to sell the property, and they presented
no evidence why they could not be compensated in monetary damages. 731 S.W.2d at 109.
372. See supra notes 360-67 and accompanying text.
373. 728 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
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ings, the receiver sought injunctive relief. The trial court enjoined the bank
from foreclosure for a period of approximately six months, ordered that in-
terest payments be made during that time period, and also required the re-
ceiver to post a bond.374 On appeal, the bank argued that the effect of the
injunction was to elevate the family law court to the status of a bankruptcy
court, without the accompanying statutory protections. The court of ap-
peals noted that well settled law provides that property in the possession of a
receiver is not subject to a foreclosure sale unless the court in which the
receivership is pending so approves.375 The court noted that such provision
does not alter the lien rights but merely suspends enforcement until the court
having custody of the property authorizes the enforcement. 376 The court
also noted that its power on appeal was limited to review of the granting of
the temporary junction to see if it was a clear abuse of discretion. 377 The
court found no clear abuse of discretion in this case in light of the require-
ment that there be monthly interest payments, and presumably also because
of the requirement for a bond and the relatively short delay, although these
points were not expressly noted.378
D. Legislation
House Bill 1504379 amends section 51.002 of the Texas Property Code in
several important respects. The act requires the commissioners courts to
designate the area at the county courthouse where foreclosure sales are to
occur and to record such designations in the county real property records.380
Sales must occur in the designated area, or, if the commissioners court fails
to designate an area, then the notice of sale posted must designate the area
where the sale will take place.381 Notices of sale must also include a state-
ment of the earliest time at which the sale will occur and the sale must begin
no later than three hours after that time. 382 The statute requires lienholders
to give written notice of default by certified mail to debtors for liens on prop-
erty used as the debtor's residence.383 The statute also provides for twenty
days opportunity to cure a default before acceleration of maturity of the debt
or the giving of notice of sale.384 Presumably, the legislature intends this
provision to apply only to residential mortgages. The language of the stat-
ute, however, is less than clear and it can, with some stretching, be inter-
preted such that the twenty day notice provision is applicable to all
374. Id. at 103.
375. Id. at 104 (citing First S. Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1976);
Cushing v. B.C. Evans Co., 33 S.W. 703, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-1895, writ ref'd)).
376. Id. at 104-05.
377. Id. at 105.
378. Id.
379. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 540, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4338 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
380. Id. § 1(a), 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4338.
381. Id.
382. Id. § 1(b)-(c), 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4338-39.




mortgages rather than only to residential mortgages.38 5 Unfortunately, the
legislature did not make clear in its drafting exactly what was intended,
although this author believes that a fair reading of this provision and its
short legislative history suggests that the twenty day notice provision was
meant to be applicable only to mortgages encumbering property used as the
debtor's residence.
IX. MECHANIC'S AND OTHER LIENS
A. Mechanic's Liens
McCoy v. Nelson Utility Services, Inc.38 6 dealt with the rights of competing
claimants to funds retained under a construction contract. The owner of a
subdivision had contracted with a general contractor for the installation of a
sewer, a water system, and streets. The contractor, in turn, ordered materi-
als from a materialman to complete its contract. When the owner and con-
tractor disputed the performance of the work, litigation ensued. The
materialman intervened in the lawsuit presenting its claim for damages. The
materialman raised the issue that is germane to mechanic's and material-
man's lien law, namely, whether materialmen have the right to the retainage
that owners withhold from progress payments made to contractors under
the terms of the general contract. The owner in McCoy had withheld
slightly in excess of ten percent of payments made to the contractor prior to
the contract breach, and the trial court had awarded the amount retained to
the materialman. 387
On appeal the owner argued that the materialman failed to perfect its stat-
utory mechanic's and materialman's lien in accordance with the relevant
statutes and that no other relationship existed between the owner and the
materialman that would authorize the materialman to claim the funds that
the owner had retained. 388 The court of civil appeals agreed that the materi-
alman had not properly perfected its statutory mechanic's lien, but, relying
on the provisions of the trust fund statute in effect at the time cause of action
arose, held that the owner retained the amount as a trustee for the benefit of
materialmen and mechanics providing labor and materials for the project
385. The specific provision reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the holder of the debt shall
serve a debtor in default under a deed of trust or other contract lien on real
property used as the debtor's residence with written notice by certified mail stat-
ing that the debtor is in default under the deed of trust or contract. The debtor
must be given at least 20 days to cure the default before the entire debt is due
and notice of sale is given.
Id. The problem in construction lies, obviously, in the last sentence. The legislature could
have easily made the provision clear by stating "such debtor" or "such residential debtor"
instead of "the debtor." The scanty legislative history supports the interpretation that only
residential debtors were to receive the additional 20-day notice protection, but without doubt
some commercial debtor will raise this provision, along with the customary Deceptive Trade
Practices Act claim, in attempting to avoid a foreclosure.
386. 736 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ).
387. Id. at 162.
388. The statutory provisions governing perfection of a mechanic's and materialman's lien
are found at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.051-.059 (Vernon 1984).
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and upheld the trial court's judgment awarding this amount to the material-
man.389 The court specifically held that the materialman's right to the trust
fund was superior, even in light of its failure to properly perfect its statutory
lien.390
Cabintree, Inc. v. Schneider39 1 dealt with the question of when a subcon-
tractor must send notice to an owner to duly perfect a mechanic's lien. The
subcontractor had supplied kitchen cabinets for home improvements but was
not paid by the general contractor. The subcontractor gave the owners a
notice that it had not been paid and subsequently filed an affidavit in accord-
ance with the appropriate statutes on the last possible day to perfect its lien
rights. The subcontractor, however, did not send a notice or copy of its lien
affidavit to the homeowner until several months later, after the owner had
paid the ten percent statutory retainage withheld to the general contrac-
tor.392 The case expressly presented the question of when notice of a lien
affidavit must be given to a property owner. The court noted that it had
found no case dealing with this question under the codification of the
mechanic's and materialman's lien statutes in the Texas Property Code, and
held that notice must be given within the same time period as required for
filing of the lien affidavit.3 9 3 In reaching this decision the court stated that
section 53.055 of the Texas Property Code, although silent on the issue of
when a mechanic's lien claimant must give notice to the property owner, is a
recodification of the previous existing statutes that is to be nonsubstantive in
nature.394 The court then referred to the prior effective statute, and based
upon the express language of that statute, held that notice of a lien affidavit
must be sent to an owner within the same period as is applicable for filing the
lien affidavit.3 95
First National Bank v. Chaparral Electric Supply Corp.39 6 dealt with com-
peting lien claims of a bank and a materialman. The materialman provided
supplies to a general electrical contractor who subsequently went bankrupt.
The owner of the property owed the general contractor certain funds. The
materialman notified the owner that it had not been paid and agreed to abate
filing a mechanic's and materialman's lien. Not having been paid, the mate-
389. 736 S.W.2d at 164. The statute that governed this case was TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5472e, repealed by Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 576, § 6, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3475,
3729-30. The successor provision is found at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001-.004
(Vernon 1984).
390. 736 S.W.2d at 164.
391. 728 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd).
392. The relevant statute for such notices is TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.055 (Vernon
1984), which provides that "[a] person who files an affidavit must send two copies of the affida-
vit by registered or certified mail to the owner at the owner's last known business or residence
address."
393. 728 S.W.2d at 396-97.
394. Id. at 397.
395. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5453(1), repealed by Act of June 19, 1983,
ch. 576, § 6, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3475, 3729-30). Section 1.001 of the Texas Property Code
specifically provides, in part, that the program of codification "contemplates a topic-by-topic
revision of the state's general and permanent statute law without substantive change." TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 1.001 (Vernon 1984) (emphasis added).
396. 727 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
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rialman then sent a lien affidavit to the owner and to the bankrupt general
contractor and subsequently instituted suit for the amount owed, seeking
foreclosure of its mechanic's lien. The bank intervened, claiming that the
amount the owner owed to the bankrupt contractor was an account receiva-
ble to which the bank had a prior perfected security interest.
The court of civil appeals reversed the trial court's holding in favor of the
materialman, finding that the subcontractor did not give sufficient notice to
constitute fund trapping notices under the Texas mechanic's liens statutes
since the notice did not specifically notify the owner that it might be person-
ally liable and that the owner's property would be subject to a lien unless it
withheld payments from the general contractor and otherwise paid or settled
the bill. 397 The court, however, awarded the materialman ten percent of the
amount of the contract since the owner was statutorily required to retain
that amount as a fund for mechanics and materialmen pursuant to the rele-
vant statutes, and since the materialman sent a sufficient notice to claim a
lien for this amount.398
House Bill 1160399 modifies the provisions of the Texas Property Code
dealing with mechanic's and materialman's liens, requiring any person fur-
nishing labor or materials for a construction project, upon request and as a
condition for final payment therefor, to provide to the requesting party an
affidavit stating that such person has paid in full each of its subcontractors,
laborers, and materialmen or, if it has not done so, stating in the affidavit the
amount owed to each party and their names.4 ° Similarly, the seller of any
real property, if requested prior to closing, is obligated to provide a similar
statement. 4 The act further amends section 162 of the Texas Property
Code, which deals with trust funds in a construction disbursement context,
and defines when a trustee acts with intent to defraud. Such intent exists if
the trustee retains, disburses, or diverts trust funds with the intent to deprive
the beneficiaries of the funds.4°2
B. Other Liens
In Inwood North Homeowners'Association, Inc. v. Harris,403 a case of first
impression in Texas, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the right of a non-
profit homeowners association to foreclose a lien established by the restric-
tive covenants for a developed subdivision. 40 4 The homeowners' association,
which itself was established by the restrictive covenants in question, brought
397. Id. at 356. The relevant statues are found in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.001-240
(Vernon 1984). Section 53.056 specifically requires notice of the owner's potential liability in
order to trap funds in the hands of the owner for the benefit of subcontractors. Id. § 53.056.
398. 727 S.W.2d at 356 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.101 (Vernon 1984)).
399. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 578, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4561 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.085 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 578, § 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4562 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.005 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
403. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 584 (July 15, 1987).
404. Id. at 587.
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action against certain homeowners who were delinquent in payment of
maintenance assessments established by the restrictive covenants, seeking
foreclosure of the lien also established by the restrictive covenants.405 The
trial court and court of civil appeals found against the association, holding
that the lien established by the restrictive covenants, which was character-
ized as a vendor's lien, did not constitute a vendor's lien as the assessment
charges were not part of the purchase price for the property. Accordingly,
the association could not foreclose against the homeowners for a default in
payment of the assessment charges. 4°6
The supreme court agreed that the lien established by the restrictive cove-
nants could not be properly characterized as a vendor's lien because the as-
sessments in question were not part of the purchase consideration for the
lots. 4° 7 The court, however, determined that the provisions of the restrictive
covenants were sufficient to establish a contractual lien.4° 8 The court then
addressed what it characterized as the crux of the matter, whether Texas
homestead law would render the contractual lien ineffective. The court de-
termined, as one basis for its holding, that the lien should be upheld since it
encumbered the property prior to the establishment of the homestead.4°9
The court found that the restrictive covenants in question touched and con-
cerned the land, that privity existed because of the successive conveyance of
fee simple estates, and that the purchasers were bound by the restrictive cov-
enants since the deeds referenced them and the restrictive covenants were in
the chain of title of the lot purchasers.410 As a second basis, the supreme
court held that the homestead right may attach only to the extent of the
property interest that is acquired by the party claiming the right.41' The
court found that since the purchasers acquired the obligation to pay the
maintenance assessments and the lien reserved in the restrictive covenants as
part of the property interest, the liens were superior to the homestead claim
and were entitled to protection. 41 2
In Keda Development Corp. v. Stanglin413 the appellate court, on remand
from the Texas Supreme Court, set aside the bulk execution sale of three
tracts of land.414 The owner owned four parcels of land, three of which
faced a road for which the city of Dallas made paving assessments. Upon
the owner's failure to pay these assessments, the city obtained a judgment
and the sheriff subsequently sold all three parcels in a bulk sale to one pur-
405. Id. at 584-85.
406. Inwood North Homeowners' Ass'n v. Pamilar, 707 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ granted).
407. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 585.
408. Id. (citing Maryland Cas. Co. v. Willig, 10 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1928, writ ref'd)).
409. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 586.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 586.
412. Id. at 587 (citing Johnson v. First S. Properties, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding right to foreclose lien estab-
lished by a condominium declaration)).
413. 721 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
414. Id. at 904.
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chaser in satisfaction of the judgment. The owner filed suit to set aside the
sale, alleging that sales should have been conducted as to each individual
parcel until a sufficient amount was received to pay the judgment. The trial
court set aside the bulk sale, and the court of civil appeals previously re-
served this decision. The supreme court, however, held that some evidence
existed that the bulk sale may have contributed to the receipt of grossly inad-
equate consideration. 415 On remand, in light of the supreme court's deter-
mination, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court judgment that
sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that the sale in bulk contrib-
uted to a gross inadequacy in consideration. 416 The purchaser at the execu-
tion sale contended that the previous owner could not challenge the method
by which the sale had been conducted, arguing that the sheriff's deed was
conclusive evidence of the sale's regularity. The court found that this argu-
ment had no merit because the statute that the purchaser relied upon dealt
with extrajudicial sales by a city tax assessor and collector, a course which
the city had not followed. 417 The court of civil appeals, however, upheld the
purchasing party's claim for reimbursement for insurance premiums paid
during the time that it held title to the land.418
415. Stanglin v. Keda Dev. Corp., 713 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. 1986).
416. 721 S.W.2d at 901. The court noted that the owner had presented uncontroverted
evidence that a single unimproved parcel, in and of itself, had sufficient value to bring an
amount in excess of the judgment. Id. at 900.
417. Id. at 901 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1059, 1092 (Vernon 1963)).
418. Id. at 902-03. The court found no controlling authority for reimbursement for insur-
ance expense although the court did find authority for reimbursement of other expenses (citing
Elam v. Donald, 58 Tex. 316, 318 (1883); Burns v. Ledbetter, 56 Tex. 282, 285 (1882); Mitch-
ell v. Reitz, 269 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1924, writ dism'd) (purchaser of lands
under void judgment entitled to reimbursement for payment of delinquent taxes)). The court
also noted that upon setting aside the execution sale, the parties should be returned to the
status quo to the greatest extent possible (citing House v. Robertson, 89 Tex. 681, 688, 36 S.W.
251, 253 (1896)). The court also noted that the policy of the law is to sustain execution sales
and parties should not be penalized for relying on the regularity of a sale conducted by a public
official. 721 S.W.2d at 903.
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